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Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors
to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and
Conflicts of Interest
MARGARET Z. JOHNS*
INTRODUCTION
Your doctor just prescribed a new drug to ease your back pain.
Wouldn't you want to know that: (i) the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved the drug for epilepsy, not back pain; (2) no reliable
research supports using the drug for back pain; (3) your doctor learned
about using the drug to treat back pain while vacationing on Maui at the
drug manufacturer's expense; and (4) the drug company is paying your
doctor to prescribe this drug? While this scenario is surprisingly
common,' the current doctrine of informed consent does not require your
doctor to disclose these facts . This Article will explain why it should?
* Senior Lecturer, University of California, Davis, School of Law; J.D., University of California,
Davis, School of Law, 1976; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1970. Many thanks to my
colleagues, Alan E. Brownstein, Anupam Chander, Lisa Ikemoto, Lisa Pruitt, Madhavi Sunder,
Martha S. West, Carter C. White, and Tobias B. Wolff, for their suggestions and support. Barbara J.
Evans was extremely helpful in commenting on an earlier draft of this Article and sending along
articles of interest. I am very grateful to my research assistants, Byron Chin, Adair Paterno, Sharon
Phosaly, and Claire Reichstein, for all their hard work. My editors at the Hastings Law Journal,
Nicholas J. Begakis, Gavin L. Charlston, and Carl Paganelli, were extremely helpful and enthusiastic.
Dr. Michael Wilkes of the U.C. Davis Medical School was most generous with his time and provided
great insight and encouragement. And my heartfelt thanks to my friends and family, especially
Carolyn, Jan, Debby, Bob, and Hope.
i. See infra Part L.A discussing off-label prescribing; Part I.B.2 discussing the lack of reliable
research for off-label uses; Part I.B.3 discussing drug company sponsorship of continuing medical
education; Part I.B.2 discussing Phase IV surveillance studies.
2. See infra Part II.B explaining that the doctrine of informed consent law does not require these
disclosures; see also James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 91 (1998) ("'[N]o appellate
cases have held that a physician's failure to disclose that a drug therapy was prescribed off-label
violated informed consent."' (quoting William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription Filling the
Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 255 (I993))); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use,
Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory
Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 190, 223 (199); Bernadette Tansey, Off-Label Disclosure on Drugs
Proposed, S.F. CHRON, Feb. 25, 2oo6, at CI (reporting that the author of a proposed California statute
requiring disclosure of off-label uses knew of no state, including California, requiring disclosure that a
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A majority of patients believe that doctors always prescribe drugs as
approved by the FDA.4 According to a poll published by the Wall Street
Journal Online, "There is a massive public ignorance of 'off-label
prescribing,' the widespread practice of prescribing drugs to treat
diseases where the FDA has not approved this use of the drug."5 In fact,
doctors frequently prescribe drugs for treatments which are not FDA
approved.6 Indeed, the American Medical Association (AMA) estimated
that 40% to 6o% of prescriptions are for unapproved uses.7 These
prescriptions are referred to as "off-label" because they do not conform
to the FDA-approved use set out in the FDA-approved label.8 An off-
label prescription may depart from the FDA label if the drug is
prescribed for a different purpose, for a different patient group, for a
longer duration, or in a combination which has not been approved by the
FDA.9
Off-label prescribing is a common, important, and necessary
practice.'" For example, pediatric prescriptions are frequently off-label
because many drugs are not tested for treating children." Aspirin was
widely prescribed to reduce the risk of heart attack long before it was
FDA-approved for this purpose.'" Off-label uses have proven effective in
treating cancer patients.'3 And off-label, antiretroviral combination
therapies have prolonged the lives of thousands of AIDS patients. 4 In
short, off-label prescribing is a significant part of mainstream medicine.
As an officer of the AMA explained, "[I]n some cases, if you didn't use
treatment is off-label).
3. See infra Part II.B discussing the proposed expansion of informed consent to cover these
disclosures.
4. Bernadette Tansey, A Patient's Right to Know, S.F. CHRON., May i, 2005, at At; Many People
Think That Drugs Should Only Be Prescribed per FDA-Approved Use, Not for Off-Label Use, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE/HARRIS HEALTH CARE POLL (Wall St. J. Online, New York, N.Y.), June 9, 2004,
at 1, http://www.harrisinteractive.corn/news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline-HI Health-
CarePolloO4vl3jss 1 I.pdf [hereinafter HARRIS POLL].
5. HARRIS POLL, supra note 4.
6. See infra Part II.A (discussing off-label prescribing); see also Cynthia A. Moyer, Off-Label
Use and the Medical Negligence Standard Under Minnesota Law, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 927, 930
(2o-5).
7. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 204 (2004).
8. The FDA has extensive requirements for labeling approved drugs for approved uses. Moyer,
supra note 6, at 930; Salbu, supra note 2, at 189.
9. Moyer, supra note 6, at 930; Salbu, supra note 2 at 189.
io. Salbu, supra note 2, at 193-94; see also David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, i02i (2006).
II. Salbu, supra note 2, at 193.
12. Id. at 194-95.
13. Id. at 193.
L4. Id. at 194, 218; Sabin Russell, Life-Prolonging Drugs Lead to Increase in People with HIV,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 2005, at B3.
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the drug in the off-label way you'd be guilty of malpractice.""
While off-label prescriptions are common and often necessary, they
present substantial risks. In many off-label uses, the drug or device has
not been proven safe or effective for treating the patient's condition. In
fact, a 2006 study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine found
that most off-label prescribing "occurs without scientific support."'7 In
some instances, FDA panels have investigated off-label uses and found
them to be ineffective or dangerous. 8 For example, doctors wrote
eighteen million prescriptions for the off-label use of Fenfluramine for
weight loss before it was discovered that nearly three hundred thousand
people suffered heart valve damage from it.'9 Unfortunately, this is not
an isolated instance where off-label uses created substantial health risks.
A recent example is Letrozole. The FDA approved Letrozole as a
breast-cancer therapy for post-menopausal women, but required a
warning that it was known to be associated with birth defects." Despite
this warning, in 2005 a number of fertility doctors prescribed the drug
off-label to help women become pregnant.'
The most recent example is Actimmune, which has been prescribed
off-label to patients with a potentially fatal lung condition, idiopathic
pulmonary fibrosis.2 ' Actimmune is approved by the FDA to treat two
other extremely rare diseases, but substantially all its sales-about $9o
million in 2oo6-are from the off-label use for pulmonary fibrosis, which
costs each patient about $50,000 per year.23 There is no reliable evidence
that Actimmune is an effective treatment for pulmonary fibrosis." In
March 2007, InterMune abandoned its efforts to develop Actimmune as
15. Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and "Off-Label" Uses of Prescription
Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 278-79 (1996) (quoting Fran Kritz, FDA Seeks to Add Drugs' New Uses
to Labels, WASH. POST HEALTH, Mar. 29, 1994, at II); see also Moyer, supra note 6, at 931 (noting that
failure to offer a thoroughly investigated off-label use to patients may be malpractice).
16. James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability
for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 296 (2oo3); Radley et al.,
supra note io, at 1023; Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 28o.
17. Radley et al., supra note Io, at 1021.
i8. Salbu, supra note 2, at 21i; Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 280.
19. Salbu, supra note 2, at 203. See generally Molly Sachdev et al., Effect of Fenfluramine-
Derivative Diet Pills on Cardiac Valves: A Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies, I44 AM. HEART J.
1071 (2002).
20. Cancer Drug No Fertility Treatment, CBS NEWS, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/I i/3o/health/mainio86257.shtml. But see Togas Tulandi et al., Congenital Malformations
Among 9ii Newborns Conceived after Infertility Treatment with Letrozole or Clomiphene Citrate, 85
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1761, 1761--65 (2006).
21. Cancer Drug No Fertility Treatment, supra note 2o; see infra note 88 (providing additional
examples).
22. Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker Stops Work on Lung Disease Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2007, at C3.
23. Id.
24. See id.
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a treatment for pulmonary fibrosis because clinical trials showed that it
failed to prolong lives and was no more effective than a placebo.25
Off-label prescribing is often appropriate, but it requires careful
consideration of the benefits and risks. It's one thing to prescribe a drug
off-label for a serious condition when there is no FDA-approved
therapy, especially when reliable research supports the off-label use. It's
another to prescribe a drug off-label where there is a safe and effective
FDA-approved alternative or where the patient's condition is not
sufficiently serious to warrant the risks of an unproven and potentially
dangerous treatment.
The frequency of off-label prescribing has increased substantially
over the past few years." Prescription drugs are a huge and highly
profitable business. 7 The druf companies increase sales by expanding
their market to off-label uses.' While the FDA previously restricted the
industry's off-label marketing, the regulatory restrictions were
challenged on First Amendment grounds. 9 In many cases, the off-label
uses are not based on reliable scientific research." As this Article
explains, off-label prescribing drives up the cost of medical care and
exposes patients to unnecessary health risks.
Additionally, patients are unaware of industry marketing practices
that create conflicts of interest for doctors.3' Drug companies sponsor
and publish shoddy research and present it to doctors at free educational
programs, often hosted at fashionable resorts with complimentary
gourmet meals and rounds of golf.32 They pay doctors to attend and to
present the marketing programs.33 They also pay doctors to prescribe
their drugs under the guise of "research" which is scientifically
worthless.' They shower doctors with gifts and free samples to
encourage prescribing.35 The strategy works. According to studies
reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association, in response
to drug company promotions doctors prescribe drugs more frequently
and nonrationally.3
25. Id.
26. Moyer, supra note 6, at 931.
27. See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
28. See discussion infra Part I.A; see also ANGELL, supra note 7, at 156-57; O'Reilly & Dalal,
supra note 16, at 299-300; Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 279.
29. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999); see infra notes 151-55 and
accompanying text.
30. See discussion infra Part I.B.i.
31. See Tansey, supra note 4; HARRIS POLL, supra note 4.
32. See discussion infra Parts I.B.2-3.
33. See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
34. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
35. See discussion infra Part I.B.6.
36. Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283
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This Article proposes that the tort doctrine of informed consent
should be expanded to require doctors to disclose off-label prescriptions
and conflicts of interest.37 It begins by describing current practices in off-
label prescribing, pharmaceutical marketing, and their regulation.
Specifically, Part L.A outlines the widespread and entirely legal practice
of off-label prescribing. Part I.B covers drug-company marketing
practices and the conflicts of interest they create for doctors. Part II
analyzes the doctrine of informed consent and explains why it should be
expanded to require disclosure of off-label prescriptions and conflicts of
interest. Finally, Part III presents the disclosures contemplated by the
proposed expansion of the doctrine of informed consent.
JAMA 373,378-79 (2000).
37. See infra Part III.B. Other scholars have suggested reforms to address these problems. See
Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of
Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 8o N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2oo5); Radley et al., supra
note to, at 1025-26 (proposing policy-makers develop mandatory programs for more extensive post-
marketing surveillance to identify non-evidence-based prescribing practices that lacked FDA
approval); Salbu, supra note 2, at 217-27 (proposing several reforms including patient disclosure of
off-label uses); Jaime A. Wilsker, One-Half Phen in the Morning! One Fen Before Dinner: A Proposal
for FDA Regulation of Off-Label Uses of Drugs, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 795, 839 (1998); David M. Fritch,
Comment, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather
than Less, Speech from Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, J. MED. & L. 315, 365-67
(20O5) (proposing that the FDA should require disclosure of all clinical trial information). While these
proposals are all promising, in my view they are not likely to be adopted by Congress, the FDA, or
state legislatures, at least at this time. I am not the first to conclude that "tort law, however imperfect,
may be the only mechanism for assuring that patients get the information they need to weigh their
physicians' recommendations, especially when those recommendations may be tainted by a financial
conflict of interest." Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L.
REv. 313, 369 (2002) (citing Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury:
Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 509 (1997); Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit
Services: Should Physicians be Required to Disclose These to Patients, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1844 (995)).
Currently, the FDA lacks the resources to monitor drugs and their promotion after initial approval.
See Oates, supra, at 1300 (discussing the insufficient resources at the FDA to monitor post-approval
uses since the primary focus of the agency is new drug approval); see also Jonathon D. Rockoff, FDA
Scientists Blast Agency's Priorities, S.F. CHRON., July 2I, 2006, at A6 (reporting on a survey by the
Union of Concerned Scientists finding that 70% of responding FDA scientists believed that the agency
lacked the resources required to carry out its mission and 81% said the agency needed to strengthen
its oversight of drugs after they go on sale). Moreover, armies of drug company lobbyists frustrate
proposals for marketing restraints. According to one report, the industry has 1274 lobbyists in
Washington-more than two for each and every member of Congress. Jim Drinkard, Drugmakers Go
Furthest to Sway Congress, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2oo5, at BI. In 2004, the industry spent $158 million
to lobby the federal government, $17 million in campaign contributions to federal candidates, and $7.3
million to support political party conventions. Id.; see also KATHARINE GREIDER, THE BIG Fix 144
(2003). Indeed, when Congress attempted to regulate marketing by adopting the balanced provisions
of the FDAMA, the industry successfully challenged the restrictions on First Amendment grounds.
See infra notes i51-55 and accompanying text. Finally, the industry lobby is equally active on the state
level. Specifically, from 2001 to 2004, drug company executives, employees, and political action
committees donated more than $i8 million to state political groups and candidates and a whopping
$83 million to lobby on the California health care and drug discount referendum in 2005. M. Asif
Ismail, Deep Pockets Contribute to Success, OrR. FOR Pua. INTEGRITY, Apr. 6, 2006,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=795.
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I. OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS, PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING,
AND THEIR REGULATION
This Part will describe two aspects of health care in the United
States today: (A) off-label prescribing; and (B) pharmaceutical
marketing. Off-label prescribing, as briefly explained above, is a
significant part of current medical practice. It allows patients to receive
needed treatments before the lengthy regulatory process has been
completed. And, since the FDA does not regulate the practice of
medicine, off-label prescribing is not subject to FDA restrictions. As a
result, roughly half of the prescriptions written today are for uses outside
the scope of FDA approval.,8 Pharmaceutical marketing is a multi-billion
dollar industry aimed at influencing doctors' prescribing decisions. As
recently reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association,
pharmaceutical marketing practices create conflicts of interests for
prescribing doctors.39
A. OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING AND ITS REGULATION
Prescription drugs are big business. The United States pays virtually
the highest prices for prescription drugs of any country in the world.4'
Prescription drugs are the fastest growing part of health care costs4' with
spending increasing at double-digit rates for each year from 1997 to
2005.4" Between 1990 and 2002, the amount spent on prescription drugs
in the United States increased fourfold from $40.6 billion to $162
billion.43 From 1993 to 2003, prescription drug prices increased 7.4%,
while inflation increased 2.5%.' Most recently, prescription drug sales
rose from $238.9 billion in 2004 to $251.8 billion in 2005 . 4 ' National
spending on prescription drugs is projected to grow at an annual rate of
10.7% from 2004 to 2013.46 That estimate may, in fact, be low. A recent
report found that brand-name drug prices rose nearly 4% during the first
38. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 204.
39. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest, 295
JAMA 429,430 (2006).
40. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 17.
41. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., PRESIDENTIAL REPORT: ADDRESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (2005); Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies, TRIAL, July 2006,
at 66; see also Marshall B. Kapp, Drug Companies, Dollars, and the Shaping of American Medical
Practice, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 237, 237 (2005) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS I (2002)).
42. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 7; see also Kapp, supra note 41, at 237
(stating that drug spending has been increasing at an annual rate of 18%).
43. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 7.
44. Id. at I6.
45. Duncan Moore, Prescription Drug Sales Rise 5.4 % for 2005, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23, 2006, at C3;
see also ANGELL, supra note 7, at 3-4.
46. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 7.
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three months of 2o06. 7 Prices for the 200 top-selling drugs are rising at
three times the rate of inflation.4 The drug industry is tremendously
profitable-usually the most profitable industry in the country.49 In 2002,
profits were 17% of sales"0 while the median profits for all Fortune 500
companies were only 3.1 % of sales." To put this figure in perspective, the
profits of the ten drug companies on the Fortune 500 list in 2002 were
greater than the combined profits for the other 490 businesses.
Since the New Deal, the FDA has regulated the drug industry under
the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA").53 In response to
deaths from the presence of a poisonous solvent in sulfa drugs, Congress
created the FDA and mandated that it regulate the safety of drugs. 4 In
1962, horrified by the thousands of babies severely deformed by the drug
thalidomide, Congress adopted the Kefauver-Harris Amendments which
expanded FDA authority to assure the effectiveness of drugs before they
could be sold in the United States.55 Under these amendments, the FDA
has absolute authority to examine the scientific evidence of safety and
efficacy of drugs. 56 In this statutory scheme, the FDA's approval of a new
drug must be based on extensive scientific evidence establishing that it is
safe and effective. 7
The FDA approval process takes six to fifteen years5s and costs
between $ioo million and $880 million per drug. The process first
47. Kevin Freking, Prices for Drugs Defy Inflation, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 20o6, at CI.
48. Angell, supra note 41, at 66.
49. ANGELL, supra note 7, at xv.
50. Id. at I I.
51. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 22.
52. ANGELL, supra note 7, at Ii.
53. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000); see also Nicole Endejann, Note, Is the FDA's Nose Growing?
The FDA Does Not "Exaggeratet] Its Overall Place in the Universe" When Regulating Speech Incident
to "Off-Label" Prescription Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35 AKRON L. REV. 491, 499 (2002). In
I9o6, Congress enacted the Pure Food and Drug Act, which addressed the purity and quality of
products and required accurate labeling, but did not regulate drug safety or efficacy. Pure Food and
Drug Act of i9o6, ch. 3915,34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938); Salbu, supra note 2, at 183.
54. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 33-34; GREIDER, supra note 37, at 155-56.
55. Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Chris Adams & Alison Young, Prescription for Trouble: FDA Loses
Hold on Marketing by Drugmakers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 5, 2003, at IA; see also Sarah D.
Gordon, Comment, Antidepressants and Teen Suicide: An Analysis of the FDA's Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals for Use in Pediatric Patients, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 932 (2005); GREIDER, supra note
37, at i6o-6i; SHWETA NAMJOSHI, A PRIMER ON: OFF-LABEL MARKETING OF PHARMACEUTICALS 5 (2OO5),
http://www.amsa.orglhp/200offLabel-Marketing.pdf.
56. Moyer, supra note 6, at 929; Gordon, supra note 55, at 932-33; NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 7-
8.
57. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 2.
58. Oates, supra note 37, at 1279; NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at II (citing O'Reilly & Dalal, supra
note 16, at 304).
59. Oates, supra note 37, at 1279; NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at ii; see also ANGELL, supra note 7, at
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requires animal testing.6 After this phase, the manufacturer files an
application with the FDA as an Investigative New Drug (IND) to begin
clinical trials on humans.6' Three phases of human testing are required:
preliminary testing (Phase I); testing a small target population (Phase II);
and large-scale, double-blind testing (Phase 111).62 During all three
phases, FDA regulations require researchers to obtain the informed,
written consent of patients.' Once the required testing is completed, the
manufacturer submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA64
which must report on all stages of testing.65 In the past twenty years, the
time required to obtain FDA approval of an NDA has dropped from
about twenty-two months to about twelve months for most druas and less
than six months for drugs that treat life-threatening conditions.
While the FDA requires the applicant to show the drug is safe and
effective, the applicant does not have to show the drug works better than
existing drugs. The applicant need only show that the new drug works
better than a placebo. In other words, the applicant must show the new
drug is better than nothing at all.68 Given this low regulatory standard,
"we usually have no idea whether a new drug is any better than an old
one." ' Often the "new" drugs are not truly innovative but are "me-too"
drugs-minor variations of drugs already on the market.7' For example,
in 2002, the FDA approved seventy-eight drugs, but "only seventeen
contained new active ingredients and only seven of these were classified
by the FDA as improvements over older drugs.""
Moreover, FDA approval does not mean that the product poses no
risks because the FDA cannot possibly identify every potential risk
before approval.7" The FDA acknowledges that some risks will not be
discovered until after the drug is approved and widely used.73 This
reflects the inherent tension between the competing goals of getting
60. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 9.
61. Veronica Henry, Off-Label Prescribing, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 365,367 0999).
62. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 75; NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 9.
63. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 75, 86.
64. 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2oo6); Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 75-76.
65. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 9. Critics question how reliable this research is since increasingly
the drug companies run the clinical trials. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 28-29, 99-103.
66. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 2o; Jane E. Henney, Comm'r, Food &
Drug Admin., Remarks at the Mid-America Coalition on Health Care Managing Medical Risk:
Current and Future Challenges (Mar. 27, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2ooo/machc327.html.
Some observers believe that this quicker approval process has impaired the FDA's ability to assess
drug safety. Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA?, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. io63, io64 (2oo6).
67. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at i8.
68. Id. at 18, 23.
69. Id. at 23.
70. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 74-93; Angell, supra note 41, at 67.
71. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 16-17.
72. Henney, supra note 66.
73. Id.
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effective new treatments to patients as soon as possible and extensively
testing new drugs to ensure patient safety. Thus, even drugs approved as
safe and effective have turned out to have undetected risks that have
endangered patients. The recent withdrawal of the drug Vioxx from the
market illustrates the point.74 For this reason, it is usually safer for
patients to take an older drug with an established track record than a
newer drug even if it has been FDA-approved for the condition being
treated.75
Unfortunately, the FDA lacks the authority and resources required
to monitor the safety of drugs after they have been approved. A recent
federal investigation concluded that the FDA lacked sufficient authority
to require drug companies to conduct studies of prescription medicines
already on the market!7 The 2006 report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that the FDA lacked an effective
process for oversight of post-approval drug safety." Even where the
FDA required post-approval studies-often as a condition of granting
expedited approval-the FDA itself reported that nearly two-thirds of
the 1231 studies that drug companies had promised to conduct had yet to
be initiated."' Senator Charles Grassley, who requested the GAO
investigation, has co-sponsored legislation to establish an independent
center for post-approval monitoring.79 Indeed, there is broad agreement
in Congress and among experts that better post-approval monitoring is
80
necessary.
While the FDA fails to effectively monitor post-approval safety, it
does regulate the information, which must accompany the drug in the
Patient Package Insert (PPI).8' This package insert is restricted to
information about approved uses,' which is compiled and published in
the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR).s3 Moreover, "[n]o implied claims
or suggestions of drug use may be made if there is inadequate evidence
74. See Peter Jini et al., Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Meta-Analysis,
364 LANCET 2021, 2025 (2004) (finding that there was scientific evidence that Vioxx caused an
increased risk of myocardial infarction from 2000 onward); Henry A. Waxman, The Lessons of
Vioxx-Drug Safety and Sales, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2576 (noting that Vioxx had been approved by
the FDA in May 1999); Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide
Withdrawal of VIOXX (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/documents/english/
vioxx-press-release.pdf.
75. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 98.
76. Andrew Bridges, Probe Finds FDA Needs More Muscle, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24, 2006, at A2.
77. Alison Torres Burtka, GAO Report Criticizes Drug Safety Oversight, TRIAL, July 2006, at 22.
78. Bridges, supra note 76, at A2.
79. Burtka, supra note 77, at 92.
8o. Okie, supra note 66, at io63.
8i. Kapp, supra note 41, at 238; Salbu, supra note 2, at 187.
82. Moyer, supra note 6, at 930; Salbu, supra note 2, at 187.
83. Kapp, supra note 41, at 238; Salbu, supra note 2, at 187.
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of safety or... effectiveness. ' '84
After a drug is approved, researchers and doctors often discover new
applications for it."' Once a drug is FDA-approved for a single specific
use, doctors may prescribe it to any patient for any use and are not
restricted to prescriptions that comply with the FDA approval. 86 The
FDA considers these treatments "off-label" because substantial evidence
regarding their safety and efficacy has not been presented or evaluated. 7
But such uses are perfectly legal. In fact, FDA policy explicitly states that
"once a [pharmaceutical] product has been approved for marketing, a
physician may prescribe it for uses in treatment regimes of patient
populations that are not included in the approved labeling." 88 Indeed, as
the Supreme Court has recognized, off-label prescribing "is an accepted
and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate in this area
without directly interfering with the practice of medicine." 89 Simply put,
the FDCA was not intended to regulate the practice of medicine.' In
other words, the FDA does not regulate off-label drug prescribing even
though it is a key component in medical practice today.
As explained in the PDR, the FDA has also recognized that the
FDCA does not, however, limit the manner in which a physician may use
an approved drug. Once a product has been approved for marketing, a
physician may choose to prescribe it for uses in treatment regimens or
patient populations not included in approved labeling. The FDA also
observes that accepted medical practice includes drug use that is not
reflected in approved drug labeling.9'
In addition to being accepted medical practice, off-label prescribing
often provides optimal patient care.9" For example, for many years
aspirin was prescribed to reduce the risk of heart attack but was not
approved for this use until 1998.' Off-label uses that represent a logical
extension of the original FDA-approved use are often seen as clinically
acceptable treatments.94 Moreover, off-label uses are frequently the only
available treatment for some serious and fatal diseases. Specifically, 62%
84. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(c) (2004).
85. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 2.
86. Moyer, supra note 6, at 930.
87. NAM1OSHI, supra note 55, at 2; Salbu, supra note 2, at 187.
88. Donald C. Arbitblit & Wendy Fleishman, The Risky Business of Off-Label Use, TRIAL, Mar.
2005; see also Gordon, supra note 55, at 942.
89. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
9o. Arbitblit & Fleishman, supra note 88; see also Gordon, supra note 55, at 942.
91. Kapp, supra note 41, at 238.
92. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES CONSTRAIN
PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES I I (i99i); NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 2.
93. Salbu, supra note 2, at 195; NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 12.
94. Radley et al., supra note io, at 1025.
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of cancer patients use drugs off-label.9" Indeed, off-label uses in some
cases represent the highest standard of care, especially in treating AIDS,
cancer, and rare diseases.
96
But, as explained above, not all off-label uses are safe. Indeed, some
off-label uses are "costly, threatening, and highly toxic." 97 For example,
the widely-prescribed diet drug, Fenfluramine, was never approved for
long-term use and, in fact, caused heart valve damage to at least 285,000
patients, according to the FDA.9s Oxycontin, a dangerously addictive,
morphine-based drug, was promoted for general pain relief.' While it is
an extremely valuable drug for the treatment of severe pain, it was over-
prescribed and abused, becoming the most frequently prescribed pain
medication in the country, and leading to hundreds of unnecessary
deaths."° Today, the highly addictive pain treatment Actiq, which is
FDA-approved for intense cancer pain that is unresponsive to other
drugs, is frequently prescribed for non-cancer patients suffering
headaches and back pain.' Indeed, research suggests that 8o% of the
95. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 2.
96. Arbitblit & Fleishman, supra note 88.
97. Salbu, supra note 2, at 202 (quoting Maryann Napoli, Chemotherapy and Informed Consent,
HEALTHFACTS, Sept. 1997, at 1, 5) (internal quotation marks ommited). For example, Zyprexa,
Risperdal and other atypical antipsychotics are prescribed off-label to treat dementia. According to
the FDA, "[W]hen prescribed off label as a treatment for dementia, older patients had a higher chance
for death than patients who did not take the medicine." Alison Young, FDA Launches Site to Warn
Patients, Doctors of Drug Risks, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, May 20, 2005, at I,
http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/9749; see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA's New Drug
Safety Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugSafety.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). Amiodarone
(also marketed as Cordarone and Pacerone) is approved to treat a specific, life-threatening heart
rhythm disorder but is frequently prescribed off label for non-life-threatening atrial fibrillation. Id.
According to the FDA, the drug has potentially fatal side effects including lung toxicity, liver injury,
and worsened heart rhythm problems. Id. Gabitril, a drug approved to treat seizures, is most
frequently prescribed for psychiatric conditions including bipolar disorder. Id. According to the FDA,
the drug has only been approved for treating seizures and its "safety and effectiveness have not been
established for any other use." Id. Even its manufacturer, Cephalon, has initiated efforts "to
discourage off-label use." Id. As its spokesperson explained, it has not done sufficient studies to
support the off-label use and the "scientific team doesn't believe there is sufficient evidence that a
drug like Gabitril would be effective in bipolar disorder." Id. Indeed, "when used off-label, the drug
has been associated with seizures in people without epilepsy." Id.
98. NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 2; O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 300; Salbu, supra note 2, at
203; Paul D. Rheingold & David B. Rheingold, Offense or Defense? Managing the Off-Label Use
Claim, TRIAL, Mar. 2001, at 52; see also Hershel Jick et al., A Population-Based Study of Appetite-
Suppressant Drugs and the Risk of Cardiac-Valve Regurgitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 719 (1998)
(finding that the use of fenfluramine for four months or longer is associated with an increased risk of
cardiac-valve damage); Sachdev et al., supra note 19, at IO71 (estimating that in 1996 alone, 18 million
fenfluramine prescriptions treated 1.5 million patients, leading to 30,500 fenfluramine-related cases of
cardiac-valve damage).
99. Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of Oxycontin: The Case for Enhancing Liability for Off-
Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429,445-46 (2003).
Ioo. Richard A. Ausness, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 133-34 (2002); Ford, supra note 99, at 430.
loi. John Carreyrou, Narcotic 'Lollipop' Beccomes Big Seller Despite FDA Curbs, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2oo6, at AI.
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patients who use the drug do not have cancer.' 2 Recently, a breast cancer
drug was increasingly prescribed off-label as a fertility treatment despite
its reported association with birth defects."' 3 An ulcer drug is used off-
label in labor and delivery cases despite the risk of a ruptured uterus. 4
The list of examples is numerous and frightening.
A 2006 study published by the AMA underscores the risks of off-
label prescribing.'5 It found that off-label prescribing is common and
usually lacks scientific support. 6 Specifically, 73% of the off-label uses
studied "lacked evidence of clinical efficacy, and less than one-third
(27%) were supported by strong scientific evidence.""'' It cautioned that
under-evaluated off-label practices-those not supported by strong
scientific evidence-may "jeopardize patient safety or represent
economically wasteful prescribing practices. ' ' 'c8
Off-label prescribing is already common and becoming more so."
By some estimates, as many as one-half of all prescriptions are for off-
label uses."0 An AMA study estimated that 40% to 6o% of prescription
drugs were given for unapproved uses."' According to one survey, off-
label prescribing of top-selling drugs doubled from 1998 to 2003. '
Another study indicated that most hospital patients receive at least one
drug off label."3 And in some fields, the number is higher than in others.
For example, according to the GAO, off-label prescribing accounts for
90% of cancer drug use, 8o% of pediatric drug use, and 8o% to 90% of
drugs used to treat rare conditions."4
Despite the frequency of off-label prescribing, the FDA has shown
little interest in determining whether off-label uses are safe and effective.
Rather than monitoring post-approval drug safety, the FDA has devoted
its resources to new drug approval."5 According to a recent study, the
102. Id.
103. Cancer Drug No Fertility Treatment, supra note 20. But see Tulandi et al., supra note 20.
104. According to the FDA: "These uses are not approved by the FDA. No company has sent the
FDA scientific proof that (Cytotec) is safe and effective for these uses. There can be serious side
effects, including a torn uterus .... " Young, supra note 97 (quoting FDA, Misoprostol (Marketed as
Cytoec) Information (May 2oo5), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/misoprostol/default.htm).
io5. Radley et al., supra note Io, at 1021.
io6. Id
lO7. Id. at 1023.
io8. Id. at 1026.
io9. Moyer, supra note 6, at 930-31.
Ito. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 204.
I I I. Tansey, supra note 4; see also ANGELL, supra note 7, at 204.
112. Moyer, supra note 6, at 93t.
113. Id. at 930.
t14. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, ACrIvrrIES OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, H.R. REP. No. 104-874, at 264 (2d Sess. 1997); see also O'Reilly
& Dalal, supra note 16, at 298. Pediatric prescriptions are often off-label because of the lack of clinical
trial research. Gordon, supra note 55, at 941-42.
115. Radley et al., supra note to, at IO2I.
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FDA focuses on the market entry of new drugs "rather than regulating
physician's prescribing practices, allowing off-label use of medications
for indications beyond those formally evaluated by the manufacturer"
and often not supported by scientific evidence."6
Of course, the American public is unaware of the prevalence of off-
label prescribing. Indeed, most of us assume that every prescription is for
an FDA-approved use."7 While we would want to know that many of our
prescriptions are not for FDA-approved uses, we are often not given that
information.' 8 In contrast to the FDA requirement of informed, written
consent for all phases of its approval trials, there is no FDA requirement
of informed consent to off-label prescriptions which the FDA does not
regulate at all."9 As one scholar observed:
[Ilnnovative therapies not undertaken as part of a study protocol
escape the special federal requirements governing informed consent.
This arrangement seems paradoxical. Formal study protocols have a
number of different safeguards that apply to research activities. In
contrast, when physicians use novel procedures or technologies in
treating individual patients, they face little supervision of their
activities....
Thus, physicians routinely, and often appropriately, deviate from the
directions contained in approved prescription drug labeling.... Again,
paradoxically, patients receive the least regulatory protection in those
cases where they may need it the most-namely, when individual
physicians may haphazardly try out a different technique under the
guise of providing innovative therapy.
20
This practice benefits the drug industry. Given the profitability of
the industry, drug companies strive to maximize sales of their
prescription drugs. To reduce the time and money spent obtaining FDA
approval, the manufacturer will usually seek approval for only a few
uses.' But once the FDA approves a drug for one, narrow use, the
manufacturer will understandably want to expand this small market by
II6. Id.
I17. Tansey, supra note 4; HARRIS POLL, supra note 4.
118. See infra Part I.B.i.
ii9. Salbu, supra note 2, at 204 n.141 ("[T]his is a very uncontrolled part of medical practice.
Doctors are doing uncontrolled experimentation in their own practices, and the American people are
being experimented on because the drugs aren't being tested adequately." (quoting Paul D. Stolley,
Chair of Epidemiology and Preventative Medicine, University of Maryland School of Medicine)). As
Dr. Sidney Wolf of Public Citizen observed, "[Hiuge numbers of people are going to be made guinea
pigs for unapproved uses of drugs." O'Reilly & Dalai, supra note 16, at 307; see also Beck & Azari,
supra note 2, at 85-87 (explaining that federal regulations requiring informed consent for FDA trials
do not apply to off-label treatments).
120. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental
Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 392-93, 399-400 (2002) (citing David. H. Spodick, Numerators
without Denominators: There Is No FDA for the Surgeon, 232 JAMA 35,35-36 (975)).
121. Oates, supra note 37, at 128o; see ANGELL, supra note 7, at I58-6I (discussing the example of
Neurontin, approved for epilepsy but marketed to doctors for pain and anxiety).
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encouraging doctors to prescribe the drug for additional, off-label uses.2
As the following discussion shows, this is where the industry's multi-
billion-dollar marketing campaign pays off.
B. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING AND ITS REGULATION
Pharmaceutical marketing is the largest item in the drug industry's
enormous budget.'23 As reported in the 2005 Presidential Report of the
National Association of Attorneys General, the industry spent $76.5
billion on marketing to physicians in 2003. I24 While estimates vary,' 5 one
recent study concluded that the drug companies spend more than $30,000
on each doctor each year. I2 6 Although drug companies cite the high cost
of research and development (R&D) to explain the soaring price of
prescription drugs,"7 the industry spends "almost twice as much on
marketing alone as on R&D.''I,8 For example, in 2002, when the ten U.S.
drug companies on the Fortune 500 list had combined international sales
of $217 billion, they spent 14% of that on R&D, 31% on marketing and
administration, and enjoyed a profit margin of 17%."9
Promoting off-label uses seems to be a critical strategy in this
marketing campaign. 3 ° According to proponents, off-label marketing
serves public policy in several respects. First, off-label information is
necessary to ensure that patients receive the most effective treatment, 1
3
and the drug companies are in the best position to provide doctors with
that information.32  Given the vastness of medical literature, even the
122. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 156-57; O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 299-300; Gordon, supra
note 55, at 928; Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 279-80.
123. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 7.
124. Id. at 32 (defining "marketing to physicians" as including: advertising in medical journals,
providing educational materials to doctors, providing product samples, fielding sales representatives,
entering into consulting agreements with doctors, sponsoring continuing medical education (CME)
programs and other promotional seminars and presentations, and providing entertainment, meals, and
gifts).
125. One report estimated that pharmaceutical companies spent $o,ooo per doctor in 200i. Kapp,
supra note 41, at 241.
126. JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN
ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 77 (2005).
127. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 37-38.
128. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 22 (quoting Marcia Angell). "In 2003, the
top ten drug companies spend 14% of revenue on research and development, and 34% of revenue on
marketing and administration." Id. at 7. In other words, for every dollar made in sales, the industry
spent thirty-four cents on marketing and administration and fourteen cents on developing new
products. Id. at 7.
129. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 48.
130. Id. at 156-57; see infra Part I.B.1.
131. David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug Companies, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1885 (2004);
Ford, supra note ioo, at 433.
132. Salbu, supra note 2, at 194-95, 199; Richard C. Ascroft, Note, The Impact of the Wash. Legal
Foundation Cases on Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices in the United States, 34 IND. L. REV. 95, 99
(2000); Ford, supra note 100, at 433.
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most dedicated doctor will inevitably fall behind.'3 In sponsoring
legislation to liberalize restrictions on off-label promotion, Senator Bill
Frist, a heart surgeon, explained: "If a conscientious doctor were to read
two medical articles before retiring each night, he would have fallen 550
years behind in his reading at the end of the first year."'34 Second,
promoting off-label uses should reduce drug prices since increased sales
volume will enable the drug companies to lower their prices.'35 Third, off-
label marketing saves costs by eliminating expensive FDA trials and the
lengthy FDA-approval process. 36 Finally, doctors serve as learned
intermediaries who are best able to evaluate the information and insure
that patients receive appropriate treatment.
137
On the other hand, critics charge that off-label promotion creates
significant risks. The drug companies completely avoid the responsibility
for establishing that a drug is safe and effective for the off-label use they
are promoting.,8 Drug companies have no incentive to conduct the
rigorous safety and efficacy studies the FDA requires."' Indeed, they will
be tempted to seek approval for a "'cheap, narrow indication and the
next day begin selling the drug for multiple, broad, and profitable other
indications.' ''4. For some drugs, the majority of the sales are off-label.'4'
The validity of the drug-company research conducted outside of the
FDA oversight process is suspect'42 since the companies are financing the
research and will directly profit from positive results creating potential
conflicts of interest.'4 3 Drug company research emphasizes the positive
features and omits information about risks and contraindications. I" For
this reason, the doctor's role as a learned intermediary is severely
133. O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 303; Ascroft, supra note 132, at 99.
134. O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 303.
135. Ford, supra note 1oo, at 434.
136. O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 304; Salbu, supra note 2, at 195.
137. Ascroft, supra note 132, at 99; Ford, supra note Ioo, at 434; see infra notes 435-39 and
accompanying text (explaining the learned intermediary doctrine).
138. Henry, supra note 61, at 369; Moyer, supra note P, at 928; Ford, supra note iOo, at 434.
139. Radley et al., supra note so, at 1O21; Salbu, supra note 2, at 205; Ascroft, supra note 132, at
too; Ford, supra note too, at 434. Indeed, the FDA itself formerly argued that allowing promotion of
off-label uses "would erode the statutory standard of proof of drug efficacy, diminish the use of
evidence based medicine, and 'could result in harm to patients form unstudied uses that actually lead
to bad results, or that are merely ineffective."' O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note I6, at 300 (quoting Janet
Woodcock, Lecture to Drug Information Association, A Shift in the Regulatory Approach (June 23,
1997)); see also Gordon, supra note 55, at 942.
140. Salbu, supra note 2, at 206 (quoting James G. Dickinson, FDA Letter, Deputy's Speech, Define
a Dilemma, MED. MKrG. MEDIA, Oct. 1996, at 12); see also O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at 307.
141. Chris Adams & Alison Young, Drug-Makers' Promotions Boost Off-Label Use by Doctors,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 2003, at iA, available at http://www.realcities.com/mld/
krwashington/news/special-packages/riskyrx/i442568o.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp.
142. Ford, supra note ioo, at 434.
143. Id. at 435.
144. Id.
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compromised. Today, rather than serving as a learned intermediary, a
doctor is often a misled intermediary. Moreover, there is no evidence
that drug companies will reduce the cost of widely used drugs. Quite the
opposite is true. For example, the price of the top-selling allergy pill,
Claritin, was raised thirteen times over five years, an increase of more
than 50% -more than four times the rate of inflation.'45
While, as explained above, the FDA does not regulate off-label
prescribing, it has attempted to regulate off-label marketing. 6 The
industry challenged the ban, arguing that it prevented dissemination of
valuable information about off-label uses to doctors and therefore
deprived patients of needed treatments.'47 In response, in 1997, Congress
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
("FDAMA") so that drug companies could distribute reprints of
independent, peer-reviewed, journal articles about off-label uses.' 8 But
to come within this provision, the manufacturer was required to seek
FDA approval of the new use within a specified time. I" The legislative
intent was to enable the drug industry to distribute the most reliable
research to doctors so patients could receive necessary treatments, but
require the FDA to police the process to ensure that the new use was
safe and effective.'
5 °
Critics challenged the FDAMA claiming it unduly restricted the
industry's freedom of speech and thus violated the First Amendment.'5 '
The challenge was initially successful,'52 but in 2000 the D.C. Circuit
dismissed the case as moot because both sides agreed that the FDAMA
did not give the FDA independent authority to regulate speech. 3 As the
court explained, "[T]he dispute between the parties has ... disappeared
before our eyes."' But the court cautioned that its view should not be
taken as a criticism or disagreement with the lower court's holding that
the FDAMA restrictions on marketing violated the First Amendment.
As the circuit court stated: "[W]e certainly do not criticize the reasoning
or conclusions of the district court .... [W]e do not reach the merits of
the district court's First Amendment holdings and part of its injunction
145. ANGELL, supra note 7, at xii.
146. Henry, supra note 61, at 372; Kapp, supra note 4, at 239; O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 16, at
297.
147. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 , 54,59 (D.D.C. 1998).
148. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. IO5-I15, ix, Stat.
2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Kapp, supra note 41, at 239.
149. Kapp, supra note 4, at 239.
15o. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 103-04; Ford, supra note too, at 442-43.
I51. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 82-83 (D.D.C. 1999).
152. Id. at 87.
153. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
154. Id. at 335.
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still stands. '55
Since this ruling, the FDA has maintained that it lacks authority to
regulate drug company speech. 156 As a result, the FDAMA guidelines
restricting off-label marketing are not being vigorously enforced.
57
Indeed, one of the lawyers who challenged the FDAMA restrictions was
appointed to oversee the FDA's effort to determine whether it should
give manufacturers more leeway to promote off-label uses 58 Daniel
Troy, a prominent First Amendment lawyer who helped the Washington
Legal Foundation challenge the FDAMA restrictions, became general
counsel to the FDA.'59 As Dr. Michael Wilkes, Associate Dean of the
School of Medicine at the University of California, Davis and a national
authority on off-label prescribing and promotion, observed, "They [the
FDA] certainly are backing off."'
Given the billions of dollars involved in prescription drugs and their
promotion, it is not surprising that abuses have occurred. In the late
1990s, a lawsuit exposed some of the most egregious practices."' Dr.
Joseph Gerstein, who was in charge of the formulary at a large
Massachusetts Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), was offered a
$20,000 "educational grant" by TAP Pharmaceuticals to reverse his
decision to exclude TAP's drug. Dr. Gerstein refused and reported the
incident to government investigators.' 63 TAP responded by raising the
stakes. According to Dr. Gerstein, in the end TAP was offering almost
half a million dollars in incentives."' TAP's plan was to sell the drug at a
discount or to give doctors free samples and then encourage doctors to
bill Medicare and patients at the full price. 6' By one estimate, this
scheme would enable a doctor with thirty patients using TAP's drug to
earn $50,000 per year."
Not all doctors were as honest as Dr. Gerstein. The federal
investigation revealed that TAP had rewarded doctors with generous
inducements, including vacations at resorts where activities included golf,
skiing, and white-water rafting. 6 ' Ultimately, four urologists pled guilty
155. Id. at 337 n.7.
156. Adams & Young, supra note 55.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. GREG CRITSER, GENERATION Rx: How PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ARE ALTERING AMERICAN LIVES,
MINDS, AND BODIES 49-51, 55, 230-32 (2005); Anne C. Mulkem, Watchdogs or Lap Dogs? When
Advocates Become Regulators, DENVER POST, May 24, 2004, at AoI.
16o. Adams & Young, supra note 55.
161. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 130-32; GRIEDER, supra note 37, at 10-I1.
162. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 10-12.
163. Id. at Io.
164. Id.
165. Id. at II.
166. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 41.
167. Id. at 13.
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to fraud, twelve TAP managers were indicted on various charges, and
TAP settled by paying a fine of $875 million, "including the largest
criminal fine ever paid in a health-care fraud case."' '
In response to the TAP case, the medical community, the drug
industry, and federal regulators took steps to curtail the worst abuses. In
2000, the AMA issued voluntary guidelines for doctors accepting gifts
from drug companies.' 69 In 2002, the pharmaceutical industry through its
association, PhRMA, adopted similar guidelines.70 In 2003, the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human
Services warned that the federal anti-kickback laws could be triggered by
excessive gift-giving by drug companies to doctors.'' Although the initial
OIG warning was broad, the OIG responded to strong lobbying efforts
by the AMA and PhRMA.'72 The final version essentially reflects the
AMA and PhRMA guidelines.'73
While these measures have promise, they have failed to solve the
marketing-abuse problem for two main reasons.'74 First, of course, they
are only voluntary and thus unenforceable.' 5 The OIG specifically states
that its guidelines are only intended to present voluntary guidance to the
industry, not to provide binding standards. 1"6 A recent report in the
Journal of the American Medical Association concluded that:
[T]he guidelines produced by these various groups and organizations
are not sufficiently stringent and do not adequately uphold a
professional commitment to patient welfare and research integrity.
None of these groups establishes monitoring mechanisms or pinpoints
responsibility for compliance.'"
Second, the AMA, PhRMA, and OIG's guidelines contain a major
I68. GREIDER, supra note 37, at I I.
169. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 128, 132.
170. Id. at 128-29, 132, 137.
171. Id. at i29.
172. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 201.
173. Id.
174. In 2004, California Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill requiring compliance with
the guidelines of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and PhRMA. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 119402 (West 2oo6) (adopting the guidelines); NAT'L ASS'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 89.
But while this Fair Drug Marketing Law is a step in the right direction, it leaves some room for
improvement since it recognizes important exceptions which threaten to undermine-if not gut-the
law's effectiveness. Specifically, exempt activities include: (I) drug samples for free distribution to
patients; (2) financial support for medical education forums and scholarships; and (3) legitimate
payments for consultants at fair market value. § 1194o2(d)(2)-(3); NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN.,
supra note 41, at 9o; see infra Part I.B.2-6.
175. George Kanabe, The Medical Industry's Practice of Giving Gifts to Doctors, FINOLAW'S WRIT,
Jan. 13, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student/2oo4o13_kanabe.html.
176. Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 20o6: Cutting Edge Legal and
Regulatory Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 124 (2006).
177. Brennan, supra note 39, at 430.
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loophole: they do not apply to "education.' ' 78 This exception is
particularly important for the drug companies to expand off-label
prescribing and increase sales. The link between education and off-label
prescribing was explained by Marcia Angell, M.D., former editor-in-chief
of the New England Journal of Medicine, and current member of
Harvard Medical School's Department of Social Medicine:'79
[I]f drug companies can somehow convince doctors to prescribe drugs
for off-label uses, sales go up. The problem is how to get around the
law prohibiting marketing for those uses.
That is where "education" comes in. If drug companies pretend they
are merely informing doctors about other potential uses, they can
circumvent the law. And that is what they do. They sponsor make-
believe education, and often buttress it by references to flimsy research
studies they sponsor."'
In short, by calling their marketing campaigns "education" the drug
companies can evade even the toothless restrictions adopted by the
AMA, PhRMA, and OIG.
The following discussion will describe how the drug industry's
promotion of prescription drugs creates conflicts of interest for doctors
prescribing both on- and off-label. Specifically, drug companies sponsor
research 8' which they then present to doctors at free continuing medical
education programs.I8 They retain doctors as speakers and consultants to
publicize and promote these uses.I3 They deploy armies of
representatives (detailers) to doctors' offices with free samples to
encourage prescribing.' 8' And they shower the doctors with gifts, meals,
and travel expenses to generate a desire to reciprocate.' 8, In addition to
promoting approved uses, the companies also use these strategies to
expand a drug's market to off-label uses. After summarizing a case
illustrating how these tactics work together to expand off-label
prescribing, each will be discussed separately in greater detail.
i. An Illustration of Pharmaceutical Marketing Abuses:
The Neurontin Case
The illegal scheme to promote the epilepsy drug Neurontin
(gabapentin) for many off-label uses illustrates the marketing strategy
178. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 138.
179. Harvard Medical School, Department of Social Medicine, Faculty, Marcia Angell,
http://www.hms.harvard.edu/dsm/WorkFiles/html/people/faculty/MarciaAngel.html (last visited Apr.
I, 2007).
18o. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 137.
18i. See infra Part I.B.2.
182. See infra Part I.B.3; see also Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 28o.
183. See infra Part I.B.4 .
184. See infra Part I.B.5.
185. See infra Part I.B.6.
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the drug companies pursue. '8 Whistle-blower David P. Franklin
produced thousands of pages of internal documents showing Parke-Davis
(later acquired by Pfizer) promoted Neurontin by paying academic
experts to sign on to shoddy research purporting to show that the drug
was effective for other uses.' s7 This "publications strategy" was designed
to pump up the sales of the drug which was "approved by the FDA in
1994 for a very narrow use-to treat epilepsy as an add-on when other
drugs failed to control seizures." ' 88 First, Parke-Davis sponsored tiny
studies. ' 9 Then it paid medical education and communication companies
(MECCs) to prepare journal articles and find academic researchers to
sign them.'" Some academic "authors" were paid $iooo.' 9' Sometimes an
"author" was difficult to recruit. As one progress report from the MECC
to Parke-Davis complained, "'Author interested; still playing phone
tag'.... [OUR COMPANY] HAS DRAFT COMPLETE, WE JUST
NEED AN AUTHOR. ' 9'
Once the company had its "research" ready, it widely disseminated
the reports to doctors and touted the results at educational meetings and
conferences around the country. 93 It allegedly paid dozens of doctors
tens of thousands of dollars each to speak at such programs and paid the
doctors in the audience as "consultants."'" According to the New York
Times, one doctor, formerly at the University of Florida, received more
than $300,000 over a three-year period.'95 This promotional scheme was a
huge success. The New York Times reported that prescriptions increased
about 70% after dinner meetings.96
And so, Neurontin became a blockbuster drug. In 2003, it had sales
of $2.7 billion, about 8o% of these prescriptions were for off-label uses
including "bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia,
restless legs syndrome, hot flashes, migraines, and tension headaches."'97
186. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 157-61.
187. Id. at 157-58; Alicia Mack, Examination of the Evidence for Off-Label Use of Gabapentin, 9 J.
MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 559, 562 (2003) (finding that the majority of medical literature on
Neurontin was composed of open-label studies evaluating small numbers of patients, with a lack of
randomized controlled clinical trials).
188. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 158.
189. Mack, supra note 187, at 562.
19o. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 158-59; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 32-33.
191. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 32.
192. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 159 (capitalization in the original).
193. Id.
194. See U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (D. Mass. 2001); ANGELL,
supra note 7, at I6o; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 27.
195. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 28.
I96. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 16o.
197. Id.; accord Mack, supra note 187, at 559 (noting that 95% of patients in a managed Medicaid
plan were using Neurontin for off-label diagnoses); Radley et al., supra note io, at 1023, 1024 tbl.2
(finding that in a study of clinical prescribing habits, 83% of Neurontin (gabapentin) uses were off-
label).
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Of course, no reliable evidence showed that it was effective for treating
any of these conditions.' g5 Furthermore, in the treatment of neuropathic
pain, one of the few off-label applications of Neurontin supported by
valid evidence, Neurontin was no more effective than its much less
expensive competitors."' Pfizer pled guilty to illegal marketing and
agreed to pay $430 million to resolve civil and criminal charges. "'" But
with sales totaling $2.7 billion, one expert described the fine as "small
potatoes."'
Unfortunately, Neurontin is not an isolated example. By 2003, Eli
Lilly had settled three lawsuits alleging that it had over-marketed
Prozac-approved as an antidepressant-for off-label uses including
migraines, Tourette's syndrome, and heart pain.2"' In July 2005, a drug
company employee filed a whistle-blower lawsuit alleging Genentech
illegally marketed its cancer drug Rituxan as a treatment for rheumatoid
arthritis." In December 2005, Eli Lilly pled guilty to federal charges and
agreed to pay $36 million to settle a lawsuit charging that it illegally
marketed its Evista osteoporosis drug as a treatment for breast cancer
and heart disease. 4 In the fall of 2006, InterMune agreed to a settlement
with the federal government of $36.9 million based on allegations that it
illegally promoted the off-label use of Actimmune to treat pulmonary
fibrosis. 5 In September 2006, Schering-Plough Corp. agreed "to plead
guilty to conspiracy and to pay $435 million in criminal and civil fines to
end a federal probe into the marketing of some drugs for unapproved
uses.
" 6
The Neurontin case illustrates the industry's coordinated marketing
strategy. The following discussion considers several of its tactics: (i)
funding research; (2) sponsoring continuing medical education; (3)
employing consultants; (4) detailing and sampling; and (5) providing
gifts, meals, and travel expenses.
198. See ANGELL, supra note 7, at i6o-6I; Mack, supra note 187, at 562: Radley et al., supra note
1o, at 1024 tbl.2 (finding that 66% of off-label Neurontin uses had little or no scientific support).
199. See Mack, supra note 187, at 562 & tbl.3, 563 (finding Neurontin to be five to twenty times as
expensive as amitriptyline and nortriptyline, and no more effective).
200. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 161; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay
$430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May
13, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo4/May/04-civ_322.htm.
201. ANGELL, supra note 7. at 161 & n.7 .
202. Adams & Young, supra note 141.
203. Genentech/Biogen Idec: Wearing the Drug Marketing Suit Well?, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. REV.
ONLINE, Jan. I2, 2006, http://www.pharmaceutical-business-review.com/article feature.asp?guid=
5C379035-9AD6-4724 -AB 9 6-3 ABBD2D 9 B8 7 t.
204. Rick Callahan, Eli Lilly to Pay $36M to Settle Charges, HARFFORD COURANT, Dec. 22, 2005, at
E3.
205. Pollack, supra note 22.
206. Drug Maker Settles Probe for $4 35M, Guilty Plea, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 2006, at 16.
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2. Funding Research
While the Neurontin example may be extreme, evidence suggests
that other post-approval research is similarly shoddy and serves primarily
as a tool to promote off-label uses and to increase sales.2" As Dr. Angell
explained, drug companies promote off-label uses through professional
education based on company-sponsored research:
You do that by carrying out "research" that falls way below the
standard required for FDA approval, then "educating" doctors about
any favorable results. That way, you could circumvent the law. You
could say you were not marketing for unapproved uses; you were
merely disseminating the results of research to doctors-who can
legally prescribe a drug for any use. But it would be bogus education
about bogus research. It would really be marketing.'8
As the Neurontin example illustrates, sometimes drug companies
procure research by simply hiring a ghost writer.2" As the deputy editor
of the Journal of the American Medical Association explained, drug
companies want a non-company person listed as the author to enhance
credibility."' One experienced ghost writer explained that while some
authors carefully review the drafts, others simply sign their names."' One
doctor who declined a drug company's solicitation to sign an article
described his experience as a warning to others." ' For little work the
company offered $2500.213
In addition to ghost writing articles, the industry has a number of
other arrangements to generate "research" about off-label uses. As
discussed above in Part I.A, to obtain FDA approval for a new drug, the
manufacturer is required to conduct three phases of clinical trials, obtain
the patients' informed consent, and report the results to the FDA."4 This
pre-approval research is referred to as Phase I through III research,
reflecting the stage in the approval process when it is conducted. After
obtaining approval, the company may conduct additional research. This
post-approval research is referred to as "Phase IV" research."5 But
unlike Phase I through Phase III research, most Phase IV research is not
subject to FDA standards or the informed consent requirement."' This
207. See ANGELL, supra note 7, at 157, 161-64 (discussing "the use of flimsy Phase IV clinical
research for marketing purposes").
208. Id. at 157.
209. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text; see also KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 31-33.
210. Shankar Vedantam. Comparison of Schizophrenia Drugs Often Favors Firm Funding Study,
WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2o06, at At.
211. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 33.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See NAMJOSHI, supra note 55, at 9; Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 75; supra notes 54-66 and
accompanying text.
215. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 161.
216. Id.
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Phase IV research accounted for at least 25% of all clinical trials
conducted in 2002, and the number of these trials "is growing much
faster than [the number] of Phase I through III trials.",,,8
Phase IV research may be conducted for several reasons. First, the
research may be conducted to determine whether the drug is effective for
additional treatments and to seek FDA approval for them.219 This
category of Phase IV research is subject to the same restrictions as
Phase I through Phase III research since the requirements for adding a
new use to the label are the same as for initial new drug approval.2 0
Because of the expense and time required to comply with these
standards, this type of Phase IV research is rarely conducted.22' Second,
the research may be conducted to study side effects that were undetected
in the initial trials.22' For example, where a drug received expedited
approval, the FDA may require post-market studies." '3 Finally, the
research may be conducted to market the drug to doctors, as in the
Neurontin case. 4
A typical Phase IV arrangement in this last category is a surveillance
study where the drug companies pay the doctors to prescribe a particular
drug and to answer a few short questions about the treatment."5 These
trials are not randomized and have no comparison group, "so it is usually
impossible to draw any reliable conclusions."' To critics, these
arrangements are "just excuses to pay doctors to put patients on a
company's already-approved drug.""..7 An article by Dr. David Kessler,
then head of the FDA, reported on a "study" where a drug company
recruited 2500 doctors to enroll twelve patients each in a trial of a new
blood pressure drug and paid the doctors $i050 for participating."" But
the trial was not conducted to study the drug, but only to increase sales."9
217. See Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 85-86 (discussing off-label use); Noah, supra note i2o, at
392-93 (discussing experimental use).
218. ANGELL, supra note 7, at t6I.
219. Id.
220. Oates, supra note 37, at I284-8 5 .
221. Id. at 1283 (explaining why this type of Phase IV research is uncommon).
222. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 162.
223. Id at 162-63. Unfortunately, according to an investigation by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), these studies are often delayed and the FDA lacks an effective process to enforce these
conditions on approval. Andrew Bridges, Probe Finds FDA Needs More Muscle, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24,
2006, at A2; see also Andrew Bridges, Companies Failing to Do Tests on Expedited Drugs, FDA Says,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 4,2oo6, at A8.
224. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 163-64.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 163.
227. Id. at 30, 39, 164. The United States Department of Health and Human Services has
recognized the problem of doctors failing to disclose their financial incentives for patient recruitment.
See Kapp, supra note 4, at 256-57.
228. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 82.
229. See id.
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Drug companies compensate doctors for engaging patients in clinical
trials.23° According to Dr. Jerome Kassirer, former editor-in-chief of the
New England Journal of Medicine, drug companies pay "$2000 to $4000
for enrolling individual patients into drug trials, and offer additional
bonuses of $2000 to $3000 when enrollment slows down over the holiday
season. ' .3' A busy physician can easily earn tens of thousands of dollars a
year from such patient enrollments.232 In instructing their sales
representatives about the importance of Phase IV trials, one company
candidly admonished: "Make no mistake about it: The [name of drug
omitted] study is the single most important sales initiative of 1993.... If
at least 20,000 of the 25,000 patients involved in the study remain on [the
drug], it could mean up to a $iooooooo boost in sales."'233 In other words,
this research is not research in the conventional sense. In reality, it is
marketing.
In addition to paying doctors to prescribe drugs under the guise of
research, the drug companies also hire private, for-profit research
organizations (CROs) to run Phase IV trials. 34 Some of these CROs are
actually owned by advertising agencies, which is itself revealing. 33 Since
the 1990s, the increasing number of trials run by CROs, rather than
academic research institutions, has enabled the drug companies to
control the research and the publication of results.2
36
The industry pays for research through other arrangements as well. 7
For example, the 2003 supplement to the Primary Care Companion to the
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry contains several articles promoting the off-
label use of Provigil, a drug approved for narcolepsy, for other medical
conditions including an unrecognized ailment described as "executive
disfunction. '23s The supplement was paid for by the drug's manufacturer,
Cephalon, which also paid the lead authors of all eight papers in the
supplement through honoraria, consultant agreements, speaking
engagements, or research funds. 39 As Dr. Kassirer concluded, "This
supplement is a shameful marketing tool."
2 40
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, drug-company-
230. ANGELL, supra note 7. at 30-31.
231. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 9.
232. Id. at 9; see also Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, i999, at At (reporting on doctor recruitment of patients, the bounties paid per
patient, and the lack of controls or expertise in these studies).
233. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 82-83 (emphasis added).
234. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 165-66.
235. Id. at 166-67.
236. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 79.
237. Stoffelmayr, supra note 15, at 279-80.
238. KASSIRER, supra note i26, at 28.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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sponsored research is biased and unreliable. In a blind study of seventy
articles about one type of drug, researchers contacted authors to
determine whether drug companies had supported their research.24' The
survey found that researchers who had financial ties to the drug's
manufacturer gave the most positive reports on the drug. 2 This biased
research prevents doctors from making informed decisions about the
drugs they are prescribing.243 As the editors of a major medical journal
lamented: "How tainted by commercial conflicts has medicine [and its
literature] become? Heavily, and damagingly so, is the answer.""
In addition to supporting studies that favor positive results, 45 the
industry further skews the research in several ways.46 Sometimes the
research reports only the positive part of the data and ignores the rest.247
For example, a clinical trial sponsored by the maker of Celebrex
purportedly showed that it caused fewer side effects than older arthritis
drugs.4 s The Journal of the American Medical Association published
these results along with a favorable editorial.49 But these results were
based on the first six months of a year-long trial which ultimately showed
that Celebrex was not superior to the older drugs.5 The editor was
understandably furious to learn that the company had the data for the
second six months when it submitted the manuscript touting the
purported benefits.2 5'
Another approach is to support studies comparing the drug to a
placebo rather than comparing it to the best available treatment. 52 Some
studies compare the company drug to another that does not really fit the
symptoms at issue. 53 Dosages can be rigged to favor the company's drug
over the competitor.54 Alternatively, the duration of treatment can be
selected to favor the company's drug. 55 Sometimes the studies limit the
241. See id. at 79-80.
242. Id.
243. See Kapp, supra note 41, at 259-61.
244. Id. at 259 (quoting Just How Tainted Has Medicine Become, 359 LANCET 1167, 1167 (2002)).
245. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 167.
246. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 107-09.
247. Id. at io8. In some cases, manufacturers prohibited or delayed publication of research results.
See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance- Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1541-42 (2000).
248. ANGELL, supra note 7, at Io8-O9; Fred E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with
Celecoxib vs Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid Arthritis, 284
JAMA 1247, 1253-54 (2000).
249. ANGELL, supra note 7, at Io9; David R. Lichtenstein & M. Michael Wolfe, COX-2-Selective
NSAIDs: New and Improved?, 284 JAMA 1297 (2000).
250. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 1o9.
251. Id. at 1o9; GREIDER, supra note 37, at 83-84, 102.
252. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 167.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also GREIDER, supra note 37, at 83.
255. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 167.
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monitoring of side effects.56 And sometimes the "principal investigator"
does not design the study, but follows the company's prepackaged
instructions.5 7 Another tactic is to repeatedly publish positive results.25
As Dr. Angell explained:
[The FDA] has no control over this selective publishing. The practice
leads doctors to believe that drugs are much better than they are, and
the public comes to share this belief, on the basis of media reports.
There is a general inflation in the notion of the good that drugs can do
(and a deflation in concern about side effects)." 9
In short, drug companies have developed a number of strategies to
increase sales by generating biased and substandard "research" that
exaggerates the benefits and minimizes the risks of their products.
Medical journals cannot be trusted to screen articles for reliability
for two reasons. First, drug companies rig the results in ways that often260
cannot be detected even by experts. Second, journal editors may
themselves be biased. Indeed, conflicts of interest on editorial boards are
ubiquitous. 6 , Most journals have only part-time editors who may have
financial ties to drug companies. 62 When Dr. Kassirer recommended to
one journal that editors should not handle articles if they had financial
relationships with companies producing featured products, his
recommendation was met with derision. As the editor-in-chief explained,
"[I]f he adopted such a policy, he would have no editorial board!2 63
Dr. Angell, who spent two decades at the New England Journal of
Medicine, described the growing problem of biased, company-sponsored
research:
The staple of the journal is research about causes of and treatments for
disease. Increasingly, this work is sponsored by drug companies. I saw
companies begin to exercise a level of control over the way research is
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 112.
259. Id.
26o. Id. at xviii-xix.
261. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 85-91. A July 23, 2o06 editorial in the New York Times stated,
"Leading medical journals seem to be having a difficult time disentangling themselves from the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries." Editorial, Our Conflicted Medical Journals, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2oo6, § 4, at I I. It commented on disturbing cases involving the Journal of the American
Medical Association and Neuropsychopharmacology. Id. As it explained,
An... egregious set of events occurred at Neuropsychopharmacology, which recently
published a favorable assessment of a controversial new treatment for depression resistant
to conventional therapies. Left unmentioned was that eight of the nine authors serve as
consultants to the company that makes the device used in the therapy. The ninth works
directly for the company. Just to make things particularly incestuous, the lead author of the
study is the journal's editor and a consultant to the company.
Id.
262. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 89.
263. Id.
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done that was unheard of when I first came to the journal, and the aim
was clearly to load the dice to make sure their drugs looked good....
There are other ways to bias research, and not all of them can be
spotted, even by experts. Obviously, we rejected such papers when we
recognized them, but often they would turn up in other journals.
Sometimes companies don't allow researchers to publish their results
at all if they are unfavorable to the companies' drugs. As I saw industry
influence grow, I became increasingly troubled by the possibility that
much published research is seriously flawed, leading doctors to believe
new drugs are generally more effective and safer than they actually
are. 6
In short, while rigorous standards apply to the clinical trials
necessary for FDA approval, post-approval research is highly suspect. It
is often a disguised vehicle to pay doctors to prescribe a drug. It is
manipulated by drug companies to produce unjustifiably rosy reports to
support promotional campaigns to expand market share. As the next
section explains, once the companies have procured the "research" they
want to promote their products, they deliver it to doctors at drug-
company sponsored educational programs.
3. Sponsoring Continuing Medical Education
Most states require continuing medical education (CME), and the
drug companies happily provide it.265 In 2001, drug companies paid 6o%
of the costs of CME, and that percentage has increased.266 Many doctors
get substantial amounts of their CME from free, drug-company-
sponsored programs largely taught by doctors who are paid members of
the drug-company's speakers' bureaus."' Drug companies spend millions
on educational grants. In 2004, twenty-three drug companies spent $1.47
billion on these grants, a 20% increase from the 2003 total.268 A
congressional investigation recently concluded that these grants are
sometimes steered by marketing executives to doctors and groups
promoting off-label uses.
69
Attendance at company-sponsored events often includes dinners in
expensive restaurants and junkets to luxurious resorts.2 7' According to
one estimate, the industry hosted more than 300,000 events in 2000,271
four times more than in 1993.7 This investment pays off since doctors
prescribe more of the sponsors' drugs after these meetings.2 73 Remember,
264. ANGELL, supra note 7, at xviii-xix.
265. Id. at 138-39; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 15-16.
266. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 139; see also KASSIRER, supra note 126, at I6.
267. NAT'L ASS'N OF A-rIORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 40.
268. Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Scrutinized Over Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I I, 2006, at Ci.
269. Id.
270. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 141.
271. Id. at 142.
272. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 71.
273. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 141. A recent example illustrates the integration of several of these
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these "education" expenses fall outside the guidelines restricting drug
company marketing.2 74 And, according to the FDA, CME-sponsored
activities are not subject to the restriction for marketing off-label uses.75
Moreover, drug companies determine what is education or research and
what is marketing."' According to the Inspector General, "The
manufacturer should determine whether the funding is for bona fide
educational or research purposes. '2 77 Not surprisingly, the industry does
not believe that sponsorship of CME programs is marketing.7s
As part of their educational programs, drug companies hire private,
for-profit MECCs to plan the meetings, prepare materials, and hire
speakers.2 79 By contracting with MECCs, the drug companies adhere to
the PhRMA and AMA guidelines against directly funding individual
expenses." But some MECCs are actually owned by advertising
agencies, demonstrating the connection between "education" and
marketing."' The MECC's goal is to promote the drugs of the drug-
company sponsor. As one candidly explained, it develops "educational
programs that foster early product acceptance.... Programs are designed
to gain a higher rate of acceptance at the launch of a new product and to
increase return on investment. '2s2 Another explained, "Medical
education is a powerful tool that can deliver your message to key
audiences and get those audiences to take action that benefits your
product. ,,s3
The industry argues that these educational programs provide doctors
with the latest information they need to practice medicine and thus
benefit both doctors and their patients. But the information provided at
industry-sponsored programs is biased. According to Dr. Arnold
Relman, editor-in-chief emeritus of the New England Journal of
Medicine, "[T]hese courses often present information that is biased in
favor of the companies that funded the courses, that they sometimes
provide information that lacks hard scientific facts, and are not even-
marketing tactics. In 2005, Serono SA, a Swiss drug company, admitted its attempts to increase sales of
an ineffective AIDS drug by taking ten doctors on an all-expense-paid trip to a medical conference in
Cannes, France, in return for the doctors' agreement to each write thirty new presciptions for the drug.
John Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure, 92 A.B.A. J., 44,46 (2o06).
274. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 137-38.
275. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 36.
276. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 138.
277. Id.
278. NAT'L Ass'N OF A-rrORNEYs GEN., supra note 41, at 32.
279. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 139; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 15-i6; see also GREIDER, supra note
37, at 71.
280. Kapp, supra note 4', at 248-49.
281. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 139.
282. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 93.
283. Id.
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handed. '84 A review by the Journal of the American Medical Association
found that drug-company-sponsored programs "always preferentially
highlighted" the sponsor's drug, and that attendees prescribed the
company's drug more frequently after attending these programs."
Indeed, drug companies admit that they track the market impact of CME
expenditures and fund only those programs that increase the use of their
products.26
In addition to sponsoring CME programs, the drug companies
underwrite professional association meetings where they sponsor free
symposia.287 For example, at the annual meeting of the American
Psychiatric Association, in addition to a $60,000 payment to the
Association, drug companies spent between $2oo,ooo and $400,000 for
each of the more than fifty industry-sponsored symposia.2m In other
words, they spent between $io million and $20 million for this one
professional meeting alone. The expense is warranted because medical
conferences provide an excellent opportunity for drug companies to
promote off-label uses. For example, a Knight Ridder report explained
how staffed sales booths at medical conventions promoted off-label
prescriptions."" Specifically, at the Merck booth, representatives
volunteered that Vioxx-the blockbuster, now withdrawn, arthritis
drug-could be used preemptively although it was not FDA-approved
for preemptive treatment." The Allergan representative volunteered
that Botox was used for back pain and migraine pain although not
approved for those uses.29" ' Sponsored speakers are paid handsomely for
their time. Indeed, one cardiologist boasted that he earned $ioo,ooo at a
single meeting of the American Heart Association." '
In sum, CME programs and professional conferences provide drug
companies a forum for promoting drugs' on- and off-label uses. While
these commercial programs are frequently criticized for bias, they
successfully increase prescribing by the doctors who attend. In other
words, while the drug companies do not consider these programs to be
"marketing" subject to regulatory and professional restrictions, the drug
companies exclusively support the programs that expand their market.
284- Id. at 92.
285. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 73.
286. Brennan, supra note 39, at 431-32.
287. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 8-9, 6o-6i. In chapter six, Dr. Kassirer traces the connections
between several associations and their drug company sponsors. Id. at 103-30.
288. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 146.
289. Adams & Young, supra note 141.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 17.
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4. Hiring Consultants
By calling the doctors "consultants" or "advisors," the companies
can actually pay them to attend company-sponsored CME programs.293
The PhRMA guidelines address these consultancies."9 The guidelines
require a written contract, a legitimate need for services, selection
criteria, and record-keeping.295 Yet critics point out that in many cases, no
real consulting or advising takes place. 6 After a few hours of lectures in
the morning, "consultants" still have ample time for a round of golf and a
gourmet dinner."9 As one doctor explained, "The companies used to call
it coming to dinner. Now it's called consulting."29' According to Dr.
Kassirer, in many of these relationships the doctor is "asked to consult
on little more than which wine to order." ' 99
A few examples illustrate the practice. When Searle launched a
campaign to boost sales of its new pain reliever Celebrex, it recruited 300
doctors for a weekend stay in Orlando, including expenses and a $500
payment for attending.3" If the doctors were willing to give talks about
Celebrex, they could earn $500 for each talk.31' Not to be outdone, Merck
held a one-day meeting in Boston where doctors were paid $i000 to
attend as consultants .3 " Health Learning Systems, a MECC, offered
$1200 to thirty doctors to stay at the Ritz-Carlton in Phoenix to learn to
use a slide set about its new drug and agreed to pay them another $1200
for each presentation the doctors gave. 3' But these examples are dwarfed
by the eye-popping $400,000 that Medtronic allegedly paid to orthopedic
surgeon Dr. Thomas Zdeblick for eight days of consulting annually.3 4
Critics contend that the PhRMA guidelines fail to correct these
practices. Indeed, the PhRMA illustration of acceptable arrangements
supports the criticism. Specifically, the 2002 PhRMA Code provides the
following hypothetical scenario:
Question: Company A invites 300 physicians/consultants to a two-day
and one-night speaker-training program at a regional golf resort. All
attendees are compensated for their participation and their expenses
are reimbursed... Training sessions take both days, and the Company
provides for a few hours of golf and meals. Does this program conform
293. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 141.
294. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 37.
295. Id. at 37-38.
296. AN ELL, supra note 7, at 141.
297. Id. at I41-42; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 13.
298. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 141.
299. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 13.
300. Id. at 29
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Allison Torres Burtka, Whistleblower, Doctors Decry Medical Industry Kickbacks, TRIAL,
Apr. 2006, at 76.
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to the Code? ...
Answer: This arrangement appears to comply with the Code...
[Spouses, it adds, should pay their own way.]" 5
In other words, drug manufacturers disseminate the company-
sponsored "research" about products at CME programs through paid
speakers lecturing to paid consultants, who then return to their practices
and prescribe the featured drug to their patients.
5. Detailing and Sampling
In 2001, drug companies fielded 88,ooo representatives or
"detailers," one for every five to six doctors.3 °6 According to one survey,
the industry spent $9 billion on detailing in 2001, compared to $4.9 billion
in 1996." Detailers are invariably attractive and enthusiastic young
people. The New York Times reported that the drug industry recruits
college cheerleaders to become detailers. 3° Indeed, one employment firm
maintains a database of cheerleaders because so many of them were
going into drug sales.3" As they say in the industry, "You'll never meet
an ugly drug rep. 3. ° Detailers visit frequently, often several times a
week, and befriend the doctors and their staffs with free lunches, free
samples, and gifts."' For example, as many as ten detailers visited one
small medical practice in rural Iowa in one day.3" ' And busy doctors rely
on the detailers to provide information about new drugs."3
Through its detailers, the industry gives away mountains of drug
samples. It gave doctors almost $ii billion worth of samples in 2001,' 4
$13.1 billion in free samples in 2003,' 5 and $15.4 billion in free samples in
2004.316 Free samples effectively encourage doctors to prescribe an
expensive, new drug even though an older and cheaper drug might be
just as good or even better.317 As one critic observed, "Sampling
effectively lowers the threshold for prescribing and taking a costly new
305. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 147-48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHRMA CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 8-9 (2002), available at http://cme.ouhsc.edu/phrmacode.pdf [hereinafter
PHRMA CODE]); accord GREIDER, supra note 37, at 74.
3o6. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 115, 126; Blumenthal, supra note 131, at 1886.
307. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 32.
308. Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx? Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at
Al.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 126, 128; see also KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 7.
312. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 68.
313. Id. at 67.
314. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 115.
315. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 32.
316. Id.
317. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 129; GREIDER, supra note 37, at 76.
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drug."' 8 Doctors often have no knowledge of cost of the "free" drug nor
any information about how it compares to an older, cheaper, generic
drug."9 The result is that doctors prescribe expensive, on-patent drugs
instead of older, cheaper alternatives. As Dr. Angell explained sampling
practices:
These [samples] were almost always the newest, most expensive me-
too drugs. The companies knew that when the free samples ran out,
you and your doctor would be hooked on them. The drugs weren't
really free, of course. The costs were simply added on to the drug
prices (these firms are not charities).'
John Kitzhaber, former emergency room doctor, two-term Governor
of Oregon, and Director of the Center for Evidence-Based Policy at the
Oregon Health & Science University, describes how sampling drives up
spending with an anecdote.32' A young, healthy member of his staff went
to see his doctor for wrist pain.322 His doctor gave him a free sample of
Celebrex and a prescription for it if it helped his wrist.323 According to
Governor Kitzhaber, no evidence suggested that Celebrex, which costs
$iio per month, is more effective than Ibuprofen which costs $io per
month.324 As he concluded, "The difference here is over $ioo which did
not provide a meaningful health benefit, but contributed to the
escalation in health care cost."325
In addition to boosting the sales of expensive on-patent drugs over
generics, sampling increases risky off-label prescribing. According to a
Knight Ridder report, drug companies "have sent off-label retail sales
soaring" by offering free supplies of specialty drugs to non-specialists.326
For example, they provided cardiologists with Prozac, approved as an
antidepressant, to treat heart conditions.327 According to the report, in
2003, five hundred thousand Prozac prescriptions were for off-label
uses.328 But these non-specialists are not aware of the risks of the drug,
including suicide, which appeared in psychiatric journals, not cardiology
journals.329
A recent policy proposal published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association concluded that sampling creates "a powerful
318. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 76.
319. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 8, 77.
320. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 115.
321. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 70, 77.
322. Id. at 77.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Adams & Young, supra note 141.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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inducement for physicians and patients to rely on medications that are
expensive but not more effective" and a "tension between current
marketing practices and good patient care.""33 It recommended that
pharmaceutical samples should be prohibited and replaced by vouchers
or other methods for helping low-income patients.33'
6. Providing Gifts, Meals, and Travel Expenses
While some physicians never accept even the most modest gift,
others "eagerly accept all such industry largesse." '332 The American
College of Emergency Physicians describes the current situation:
Gifts from industry to physicians take many forms, and may include
the pens and notepads that are ubiquitous in doctors' offices and
throughout hospitals, including emergency departments; reference
tools, such as sponsor-labeled copies of the Sanford Guide to antibiotic
usage and even major emergency medicine textbooks; snacks and food
provided to ED [emergency department] staff on duty or to residents
for the regular conferences; and invitations to hear drug-company-
sponsored "educational" presentations at a posh restaurant or local
country club.333
When sponsoring professional meetings, drug companies distribute
many gifts. According to one account:
Many big professional meetings resemble bazaars, dominated by garish
drug company exhibits and friendly salespeople eager to ply doctors
with gifts while they pitch their companies' drugs. Doctors wander the
vast exhibit halls carrying canvas bags displaying drug company logos
and brimming with goodies, munching on free food, and partaking of
all sorts of free services, such as cholesterol screening and putting
green practice. Instead of sober professionalism, the atmosphere of
these meetings is now trade-show hucksterism.334
Dr. Kassirer describes the unsolicited gifts received by one doctor in
one month.335 They included five invitations to top restaurants, gift
certificates, an all-expense paid trip to Cancdin with a $iooo honorarium,
and an all-expense paid trip to a resort in Phoenix with a $2000
honorarium along with $ioo for incidental expenses.336 Both the Canctin
and Phoenix offers would enable the doctor to earn more money by
delivering paid lectures for the drug companies.337
The drug companies contend that the 2002 PhRMA guidelines
33 o . Brennan, supra note 39, at 43 1.
331. Id.
332. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, GIFTS TO EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS FROM THE
BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY (2005), http://www.acep.org/webportal/PracticeResources/issues/medleg/ethics/
biomedgifts.htm.
333. Id.
334. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 145; accord KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 3-5.
335. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 4-5.
336. Id.
337. Id.
May 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
adequately addressed the problem."'5 The guidelines do restrict gift
giving. Specifically, they limit gifts to: "(i) items of modest value ($ioo or
less) if they primarily benefit patients (e.g., medical textbooks); or (2)
items of minimal value if they are associated with a professional's
practice (e.g., pens, notepads)."33 9 But compliance with the code is
voluntary.34 Moreover, the code fails to specify how often these gifts may
be given-every year? every week? every day?34 ' And, of course, the
code doesn't apply to "education." 2
Have the PhRMA guidelines actually curtailed gift giving?
Information obtained under a Vermont law documents drug company
gift practices since the PhRMA guidelines were adopted. In 2002,
Vermont adopted the Pharmaceutical Marketing Disclosure Law (or Gift
Disclosure Law) which requires disclosure of some marketing
expenditures.343 Specifically, the law requires the disclosure of "the value,
nature, and purpose of any gift, fee, payment, subsidy or other economic
benefit" provided in connection with marketing drugs to health-care
providers.3" The Vermont Attorney General's Office must aggregate the
information and publish an annual report.345
Despite significant exceptions that result in the understatement of
actual expenditures, 346 the Attorney General's 2005 report is revealing.
During FY 2004, forty-eight drug companies spent $3.11 million on fees,
travel expenses, and other direct payments to Vermont health care
providers, a 26% increase from the $2.47 million spent in 2003.347 "In FY
[2o]o4, physicians and other prescribers received 54% of the total
payments and benefits, compared with 49% in FY 2003."348 Beginning in
2004, the drug companies were required to report the names of recipients
338. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 38.
339. Id. (citing the PHRMA CODE, supra note 305, at 4-5).
340. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 132.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 137.
343. NAT'L AsS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at go. Maine, Minnesota, West Virginia, and
the District of Columbia have similar laws and at least nine other states are considering bills to require
drug companies to publicly report gifts. Prescription Drugs: Nine States Looking Into Pharmaceutical
Company Gifts to Physicians, KAISERNETWORKORG, Feb. 17, 2oo6, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/
daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=3&DR ID=35488.
344. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 90-91 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2005
(2oo6)).
345. Id. at 91.
346. Id. at 91-92. Specifically, the law exempts: (i) free samples intended for distribution to
patients; (2) payment of compensation and expenses associated with clinical trials; (3) gifts and
payments with a value under $25; (4) scholarships and support for medical students, residents, and
fellows to attend medical conferences; (5) unrestricted grants for continuing medical education
programs; and (6) drug rebates and discounts. Id. at 91. Moreover, the required reporting does not
include expenditures on advertising or the salaries of detailers. Id. at 92.
347. Id. at 91.
348. Id.
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along with the value of gifts.349 According to the Attorney General's
report, 426 recipients "received an aggregate amount of $1,450,758
during the last six months of FY [20]04, the [twenty-five] recipients who
received the greatest amount of reportable gifts [during this period]
received [$9oo,84]. '35° The top ten doctors received payments between
$20,000 and $8o,ooo. 35 ' On a national basis, the $3.11 million spent by
pharmaceutical manufacturers on fees, travel expenses, and other direct
payments in FY 2004 in Vermont would amount to $1.45 billion.352 Of
course, these gifts were all given after the PhRMA guidelines were
adopted to discourage excessive gift giving. In short, two years after the
PhRMA guidelines were adopted, gifts to doctors had not decreased at
all, but had actually increased significantly. And this public report is only
for the tiny state of Vermont. Imagine the likely figures for California
where 20,000 of the nation's 83,000 drug detailers work.353
The industry defends these practices. According to Scott Lassman,
Associate General Counsel for PhRMA: "The [PhRMA] Code allows
these items because they are nothing more than business courtesies that
do not influence prescribing decisions. Indeed, it would be highly
disrespectful to physicians to suggest that their prescribing decisions
could be improperly influenced by a business courtesy, such as a pen or
medical textbook.
'354
Doctors echo this view. Many are insulted by the suggestion that
drug-company gifts influence their prescribing practices.35 A letter to the
editor by Dr. Patrick Sweeney explains:
I still consider medicine to be the noblest of professions and those who
enter it to be individuals of high ethical and moral character. They are
the best and brightest who studied long and hard to be at the top of
their college classes so that they could get into medical school, where
they studied harder to be competitive candidates for residency
programs. They graduated with $ioo,ooo in educational debts, then put
their personal lives and earning potential on hold for three to five more
years during residency. To imply that such professionals could be
"bribed" with a $4 mug into prescribing a medication that will cost
their patients three to four times that of an equally effective cheaper
alterative is demeaning and insulting to the majority of physicians who
place the interest of their patients first and who practice cost-conscious
medicine. Frankly it is offensive to think that physicians can be so
349. Id. at 92.
350. Id.
351. WILLIAM H. SORRELL, PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING DISCLOSURES: REPORT OF VERMONT
ArTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM H. SORRELL 5 (2005).
352. Id. at .
353. Press Release, CALPIRG, Fair Rx Prices for Californians (Sept. 16, 2004), http://calpirg.org/
CA.asp?Id2=I4364.
354. NAT'L AsS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 38.
355. See KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 63-67.
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easily duped. 356
But critics of drug-company gifts are not accusing the doctors of
being corrupt, but of being human. Social science research establishes
that the very human trait of reciprocation is deeply engrained."' This
research suggests that drug company gifts may exert a powerful-though
unconscious -influence on physician prescribing behavior.15' Even small
gifts "'may be surprisingly influential.""'3 9 In 2000, the Journal of the
American Medical Association published a review of the literature on the
subject, which found relationships with drug representatives resulted in
"nonrational" prescribing, rapid adoption of new drugs, decreased
prescription of generics, and higher prescription costs. 36o After enjoying
drug-company hosted meals, doctors were more likely to ask for that
company's drugs to be added to their practice formularies. 6  In its
position paper on the subject, the American College of Physicians noted
that the "gift relationship" creates a sense of obligation.3,2 As it
concluded:
[T]he prevailing purpose of the gift is to establish the identity of the
donor in the mind of the recipient and to oblige the recipient to
reciprocate.... The acceptance of even small gifts can affect clinical
judgment and heighten the perceptions (as well as the reality) of a
356. Patrick Sweeney, Drug Company Gifts: A Response, GEORGE STREET J., Dec. 6, 2002,
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/George-Street-Journal/vo12 7 /27 GSJi 4 d.html.
357. See KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 69-70; Blumenthal, supra note 131, at 1887; Kapp, supra note
41, at 249.
358. See Blumenthal, supra note 131, at 1887; Kapp, supra note 41, at 249-50; Jerome P. Kassirer
Financial Indigestion, 284 JAMA 2156, 2157 (2000); Salbu, supra note 2, at 207 (citing David
Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583,
593 (994) (noting the recent tendency of drug companies to provide gifts that were "particularly
likely to influence the treatment decisions of physicians")); see also Jason Dana & George
Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252
(2003); Wazana, supra note 36, at 373.
359. Am. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 332 (quoting Dana & Loewenstein, supra
note 358, at 252-55); see also KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 68-69 (stating that doctors asking to add
new drugs to a hospital's formulaires were nine to twenty-one times more likely to have interaction
with drug companies despite the fact newly requested drugs had no advantage over the old drugs);
Dilek Guldal & Semih $emin, The Influence of Drug Companies' Advertising Programs on Physicians,
30 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERV. 585 (2000) (investigating influence of drug company advertising programs on
physicians); Kapp supra note 4I, at 250 ("Evidence is steadily mounting that we physicians are, in fact,
influcned by the industry's largess." (citations omitted)); James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, Effects
of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on Physician Prescribing Practices, 102 CHEST 270, 273 (1992); cf.
Katherine S. Mangan, Strong Medicine for Doctors: 'Just Say No' to Gifts from Drug Reps, A
Columbia U. Physician Urges His Colleagues, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 9, 2004, at A28 (urging
physicians not to accept gifts from drug reps).
360. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 73; Wazana, supra note 36, at 375; Elaine Zablocki, Drug Company
Gifts May Affect the Way Doctors Practice Medicine, WEBMD, Jan. 18, 2000, http://webmd.com/
content/article/2 I/I728_54165.htm.
361. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 73.
362. Id.
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conflict of interest.6 3
Yet, doctors "'are generally unaware of the bias, so they do not
make efforts to correct for it."'36 4 In one study, fewer than half of the
faculty surveyed thought that they were influenced by free samples,
subsidized education, meals, and gifts. 361 Ironically, although most
physicians deny that they are influenced by marketing efforts, they
believe their colleagues are influenced by the same efforts. 36" As one
observer noted, "'Evidence is steadily mounting that we physicians are,
in fact, influenced by the industry's largess. The proof does not by itself
matter. What matters is how blind we are to the fact that we are being
influenced.' ' 36' And a study reported in the Journal of the American
Medical Association documented a three-fold increase in the use of a
particular drug following one company's marketing campaign. 6 Another
study concluded that while doctors reported relying on scientific
literature to make prescribing decisions and discounted the influence of
detailers and drug marketing, in fact they predominately relied on
commercial information.36' The professional blindness to the influence of
even small gifts is not a quibble about trivial trinkets. A thorough review
of the literature on gifting concluded that "most studies found negative
outcomes associated with the interaction.""37
The marketing influences on prescribing decisions have adverse
consequences for both the individual patient and for our health care
system. For the individual patient, the aggressive promotion of
prescription drugs presents three main problems. First, if the use is off-
label, the drug may be ineffective or downright detrimental in treating
the medical condition, and there is usually no scientific evidence to
support the off-label use.37' Second, the increasing reliance on drug
363. Id.
364. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 332 (quoting Dana & Loewenstein, supra
note 358, at 252).
365. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 63.
366. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 72; KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 72; AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, supra note 332 (citing W. P. McKinney et al., Attitudes of Internal Medicine Faculty and
Residents Toward Professional Interaction with Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives, 264 JAMA 1693,
1693-97 (I99o)).
367. Kapp, supra note 4I, at 250 (quoting Howard Brody, A Matter of Influence, 21 HEALTH AFF.
232, 232 (2002)); accord KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 71-73 (discussing denial and self-deception with
respect to drug marketing influence).
368. Michael E. Dieperink & Lisa Drogemuller, Industry-Sponsored Grand Rounds and
Prescribing Behavior, 285 JAMA 1443, 1443-44 (2001); accord ANGELL, supra note 7, at 141 (stating
that doctors generally prescribe more of the sponsor's drugs after attending a continuing medical
education meeting provided by the sponsor).
369. See Jerry Avorn et al., Scientific Versus Commercial Sources of Influence on the Prescribing
Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4, 4-8 (1982).
370. Wazana, supra note 36, at 378.
371. See Radley et al., supra note Io, at 1021.
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therapies creates the danger of overmedication and drug interactions.372
And finally, the heavily promoted drug is sure to be more expensive than
an off-patent treatment or a generic drug.373 From a public health
perspective, this escalating expense burdens our entire health care
system.3 74 The ripple effect of these individual prescribing decisions has
become a tidal wave. According to a report by the National Association
of Attorneys General, the single biggest factor driving the increase in
healthcare costs is the price of prescription drugs.375 Experts estimate that
the off-label market ranges from 20% to 6o% of the nation's $235 million
prescription drug bill.
76
The problem is reflected in Medicaid's policy for covering off-label
prescriptions. In 1997, Congress named Drugdex Information Service as
one of the three organizations that determine whether off-label uses will
be covered by Medicaid.377 Drugdex is a large firm "that includes medical
education and communication companies. ' '178 These MECCs conduct
flimsy Phase IV research and present CME courses on off-label uses
which end up being listed on the Drugdex list.379 Given this arrangement,
one might expect Drugdex to list a large number of off-label uses, and it
does-twice as many as the other two approved directories which are
nonprofit. 38° According to Drugdex, Neurontin-the example used above
to illustrate overly-aggressive off-label promotion318 - can be prescribed
for "hiccups, nicotine withdrawal, migraine, and just about anything else
you care to name, and Medicaid has to pay for it."3 ' And, of course, none
of these uses were ever subject to FDA scrutiny."'3 In other words,
taxpayers end up paying for expensive prescription drugs that have never
been proven safe or effective for treatment of the conditions for which
they are prescribed. And the financial consequences are sure to escalate
372. See ANGELL, supra note 7, at 169-72.
373. An example provided by letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association illustrates
the point. E. Haavi Morreim, Prescribing Under the Influence, MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS
(SANTA CLARA UNIV.), http://www.scu.edulethics/publications/submitted/morreim/prescribing.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2007). A patient with an infected insect bite was initially prescribed penicillin, the
preferred drug for minor infections. Id. But the intern's prescription was overruled by the resident
who prescribed a new antibiotic costing $183 a day. Id. The attending physician looked into the matter
and found the resident had just been entertained by the drug representative of the company that made
the new drug. Id. This anecdote is borne out by the studies documenting the effectiveness of company
promotions where the touted benefits are not supported by the scientific literature.
374. See ANGELL, supra note 7, at xiii.
375. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 7; accord ANGELL, supra note 7, at xii.
376. See Bernadette Tansey, Hard Sell, S.F. CHRON., May i, 2005, at AI.
377. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 204.
378. Id. at 204-05.
379. See id. at 205.
380. Id.
381. See supra Part 1.B..
382. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 205.
383. See id. at 206.
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since the recently enacted Medicare prescription drug benefit will cover a
number of off-label uses."'4
The pharmaceutical industry has argued in favor of relaxed
regulation of drug marketing on the grounds that drug companies
disseminate valuable information about the latest pharmaceutical
advances to busy doctors who would otherwise fail to provide their
patients with the best available treatment.35 But the information
provided by drug companies is not a valuable resource for busy doctors
because it is biased and unreliable. Biased sources are actually
"distracting [doctors] from getting objective information and
encouraging them to prescribe unapproved, unnecessary, and
unnecessarily expensive medications.
'5386
Health care professionals are increasingly aware of the problem of
marketing affecting prescribing decisions. The American College of
Emergency Physicians has recognized that "'such promotional [activity]
has been proven to influence medical decision-making, and studies have
found decision makers unable to recognize its impact."'"" s The American
College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine's Ethics
and Human Rights Committee adopted a position providing that
accepting "'gifts, hospitality, trips and subsidies of all types from
industry.., is strongly discouraged. Physicians should not accept gifts,
hospitality, services, and subsidies from industry if acceptance might
diminish, or appear to others to diminish, the objectivity of professional
judgment.' '' 388 The members of the American Medical Student
Association adopted a PharmFree campaign seeking an end to gift
giving, free lunches, sponsored education, and paid speaking. 3s More
than 5000 students have taken the pledge to accept no money, gifts, or
hospitality from the drug industry and not to rely on information from
drug detailers.39
To fulfill their professional obligations to their patients, doctors
need a reliable "evidence-based analysis of the relative clinical
effectiveness of prescription drugs. 391' Evidence-based medicine is the
384. Moyer, supra note 6, at 927.
385. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56-57 (D.D.C. 1998).
386. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 85.
387. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, supra note 332 (quoting ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR
GRADUATE MED. EDUC., PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRADUATE MEDICAL
EDUCATION AND INDUSTRY 2 (2oo2), http://www.acgme.org/acwebsite/positionpapers/pp-gmeguide.
pdf).
388. Kapp, supra note 41, at 251 (quoting Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations, Part I:
Individual Physicians, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 396,397 (2002)).
389. Jim Ritter, Medical Students Just Saying No to Drug Company Gifts: Movement Growing to
Reject Overtures from Pharmaceutical Reps, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at zo.
390. Id.
391. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 77.
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systematic analysis of results of controlled trials.39 If rigorous criteria are
applied, the recommendations provided by this research are objective
and highly reliable.393 Fortunately, some recent initiatives may provide
the needed alternative to doctors' misplaced reliance on drug-company
marketing to make prescribing decisions.
Specifically, the FDA has launched a website called Drug Watch,
which discloses risk information about off-label prescriptions.394 On the
state level, the proceeds from the Neurontin settlement are funding
grants to improve prescribing by educating health care professionals
about drug company marketing and sources of impartial and balanced
information about drugs.395 As Dr. Linda Pinsky of the University of
Washington's new program explained, drug companies spend more than
$12 billion annually on marketing in the United States, which is more
than is spent on medical education nationally.396 The industry knows the
effects of this advertising. According to Dr. Pinsky, "[T]he CEOs of
these businesses are neither philanthropists nor stupid. The
pharmaceutical industry conducted outcome studies on their advertising
campaigns long before they did on their medications."3"
The Center for Evidence-Based Policy at the Oregon Health and
Science University is developing a comprehensive database for evidence-
based medicine. The Center has combined a coalition of thirteen states
and two other organizations to evaluate "the relative clinical
effectiveness of [twenty-five] major classes of prescription drugs." '399 This
approach offers the hope both of controlling unnecessary spending on
expensive new prescription drugs which are no more effective than the
older and cheaper generics, and also of protecting patients from adverse
health effects. For example, the Oregon Center identified cardiac
problems associated with Vioxx in 2001, reported these risks to the
392. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 82; see Oates, supra note 37, at I273-74 (explaining how the
absence of reliable research on off-labels uses "frustrates the effective practice of evidence-based
medicine").
393. KASSIRER, supra note 126, at 82.
394. Young, supra note 97; see U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA's New Drug Saftey Initiative,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugSafety.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 20o7).
395. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Cal. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Lockyer
Announces Availability of Pharmaceutical Public Education Grants Under Settlement with Warner-
Lambert in Neurontin Off-Label Marketing Case (Aug. 31, 2005),
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=12io. This is the first phase of a program developed by the
attorneys general of California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and
Vermont. Id.
396. Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Attorney Gen., UW Awarded $400,000 to Educate
Doctors About Drug Marketing (Apr. 13, 2006), http://www. atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?&id=4296.
397. Id.
398. See NAT'L Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 77.
399. Id.
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public, and discouraged its purchase by Medicaid."' Vioxx was not
withdrawn from the market for these risks until 2004.4'0 Similarly, the
Dartmouth College Project is creating "Prescription Drug Fact Boxes"
providing evidence-based information quickly-similar to the format of
nutrition labeling for food-for doctors to use when prescribing drugs.4 2
States are beginning to use this evaluative process in compiling their
formularies or Preferred Drug Lists (PDLs). In the Medicaid program,
PDLs are adopted to provide which drugs may be prescribed without
seeking a prior authorization. 43 As of 2004, twenty-seven states had
adopted PDLs.4 °4 The listed drugs are most frequently prescribed by
doctors.4 5 To get on the PDL, drug companies offer better discounts to
the states in addition to those required by federal law.406 In addition to
enabling states to negotiate better discounts,4' PDLs can become an
objective source of information for prescribers. For example, in 2002,
Oregon adopted an evidence-based PDL.4° While cost is a factor in the
decision to include a drug on the PDL, it is the last factor.4 ' 9 Similarly, in
2002, Michigan implemented a PDL based on clinical evaluations to
determine the best drugs in forty-four drug classes.41 0 The benefits of this
plan were immediate: a savings of $45 million for the first year for
330,000 participants.
Information about relative cost is also becoming more accessible.
Attorneys General are creating pharmaceutical price websites to enable
consumers to compare retail prices.42 These websites enable doctors and
patients to comparison shop for prescription drugs.4 3 The range can be
significant. In Maryland, in April 2004, for example, prices varied more
than $ioo for a thirty-day supply of a single drug.14 Similarly, a recent
survey in New York found that the price of a commonly-prescribed,
cholesterol-lowering drug, Zocor, was $96 at one pharmacy and $19o at
another only four miles away.41 Vermont has adopted a Detailing
400. Id. at 79.
4oi. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., supra note 74.
402. Associated Press, Doctors to Learn About Drug Marketing Practices, THE BARRE MONTPELIER
TIMEs ARGus, Apr. 14, 2006, at B2.
403. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 41, at 83.
404. Id. at 84.
405. Id. at 83.
4o6. See id.
407. Id. at 84.
4o8. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 85.
412. Id. at 94.
413. See id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
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Disclosure Law which requires drug marketers to disclose to doctors and
other prescribers the prices of the drugs they market as well as the prices
of other drugs in the same therapeutic class.
These initiatives provide unbiased, evidence-based information to
doctors to offset the biased and exaggerated claims of the drug
companies. But the reality is that pharmaceutical marketing is growing,
not shrinking, and that doctors rely on drug company promotional
materials in making prescribing decisions. Unfortunately, many doctors
are unaware of marketing's influence on their prescribing decisions, deny
that it has any effect, and mistakenly report that they rely on scholarly
articles rather than promotional materials in making prescribing
decisions. And, of course, patients have no idea of the pervasive drug-
company influence.
II. EXPANDING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT TO
REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
As the preceding Part explains, off-label prescribing of drugs which
have not been proven safe or effective for the prescribed use drives up
the cost of health care and exposes patients to unnecessary risks.
Aggressive drug marketing results in the prescription of expensive new
drugs when older ones are equally effective, less expensive, and less
risky. Moreover, industry marketing creates conflicts of interest for
doctors. I propose that the tort doctrine of informed consent be
expanded to require doctors to disclose off-label uses and conflicts of
interest created by drug-company marketing. This Part describes the
evolution of the doctrine of informed consent and then analyzes the
proposed expansion of the doctrine.
A. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT
The doctrine of informed consent reflects the value we place on
patient autonomy. Until the early twentieth century, doctors were not
required to inform their patients of the risks of and alternatives to a
prescribed treatment." ' The law assumed that doctors knew best and that
patients were sufficiently protected by their doctors' interest in their
well-being."'s The doctrine of informed consent-now adopted in all fifty
states-transformed this understanding and with it the doctor-patient
relationship.419
416. Id. at 92.
417. See Morris, supra note 37, at 317.
418. Id. at 313-17.
419. AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 78 (2003);
Morris, supra note 37, at 315. Despite this widespread acceptance, the doctrine has its critics. See id. at
315-16; Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE. L.J. 889, 904-06 (1994); Aaron
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In the beginning, the patient's claim for lack of consent was framed
as a battery action."' Battery arises where the plaintiff is touched without
consent."' In the earliest cases, the patient had either refused surgery or
consented to a different procedure than the one the surgeon actually
performed, so battery fit the facts.422 As Justice Cardozo explained,
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages." '423 For example, in one early case, the
plaintiff successfully alleged a battery cause of action when she
consented to surgery on one ear, but the surgeon operated on her other
ear.
424
Over time, as patients asserted greater autonomy rights, the doctrine
of informed consent evolved as a negligence theory.' As the Kansas
Supreme Court declared in 1960, "Anglo-American law starts with the
premise of thorough-going self determination" which imposes on doctors
the duty to make "those disclosures which a reasonable medical
practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.42
6
Today, the medical profession adopts this informed patient approach as
the appropriate standard of care.4 7 Under this approach-as in other
medical malpractice cases-negligence is determined by whether the
doctor conformed to the standard of care of other physicians in good
standing.4  This medical-custom standard is followed in a slight majority
of states, many under statutory authority. 9
Twerski & Neil Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 6o8.
420. Noah, supra note 120, at 364; Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to Inform of Newly
Developed Therapy, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43, 44 (I990).
421. Noah, supra note i2o, at 364.
422. Morris, supra note 37, at 318-i9.
423. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. I914), quoted in Morris, supra note
37, at 317.
424. Mohr v. Williams, io4 N.W. 12, 15-16 (Minn. i9o5).
425. Noah, supra note 12o, at 364; see also Morris, supra note 37, at 319, 323; Prillaman, supra note
420, at 44-
426. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, I1O6 (Kan. I96O), discussed in Morris, supra note 37,
at 325-26.
427. The policies of both the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital
Association (AHA) recognize that good medical practice requires the physician to keep the patient
informed. Robert John Kane, Information Is the Key to Patient Empowerment, I I ANNALS HEALTH L.
25, 29 (2002).
428. Natanson, 350 P.2d at I Io6, discussed in Morris, supra note 37, at 326; Prillaman, supra note
420, at 45.
429. DAN B. DoBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 655 (20OO); see also Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 88;
Morris, supra note 37, at 327; Prillaman, supra note 420, at 45. See generally Laurent B. Frantz,
Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of
Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d ioo8 (1978 & Supp. 2oo6).
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But many courts have rejected the medical-custom standard as
undermining the very notion of patient autonomy and self-determination
that informed consent is designed to protect.43 In a landmark decision,
Canterbury v. Spence,43' the court refocused the analysis on the
information the patient would need to make an informed decision rather
than on the information a doctor would customarily disclose.432 As the
court explained, the doctor must disclose the "material risks" which a
reasonable patient would consider significant.433 In adopting this
approach, the California Supreme Court explained that self-
determination requires the patient, not the doctor, to set the standard
since her right to weigh her subjective fears against the disclosed risks is
a personal matter, not a medical question, and must be "reserved to the
patient alone." '434
The obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent dovetails
with the learned intermediary doctrine. Under the learned intermediary
rule, doctors, not drug companies, are responsible for informing patients
of the risks of prescription drugs.435 The rule reflects the courts' view that
warnings from drug companies would not be feasible and would interfere
with the doctor-patient relationship.436 The rationale is that only medical
professionals have the required knowledge, training, and judgment to
determine which drugs would be the best treatment for individual
patients.37 While critics have argued that doctors fail to pass on sufficient
information about drugs,"' the doctrine has been adopted in almost
every state.439
430. See Noah, supra note 120, at 367.
431. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), discussed in Morris, supra note 37, at 328-29.
432. Id. at 786-87; accord Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972) (adopting the reasonable patient
standard of care); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972) (adopting the reasonable patient
standard of care). Additionally, consider the Pennsylvania statute adopting the reasonable patient
standard as the standard of care for informed consent. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 89 n.132 (citing
40 PA. STAT. ANN. §1301.8 11-A (Purden Supp. 1997) (repealed 2002)).
433. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. This reasonable patient standard has been criticized as
undermining individual patient autonomy, and some courts have adopted a subjective standard for
each particular patient. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 6o6 P.2d 554 (Okla. 198o); accord Morris, supra
note 37, at 329-30.
434. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at io.
435. DOBBS, supra note 429, at ioio; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 6o8 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998); Frank C. Woodside, III, & Margaret M.
Maggio, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Is It Eroding?, MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES,
Apr. 21, 2005, at 2I. A companion theory that can be advanced in off-label cases is that the drug
company's insulation from products liability actions is defeated where it overpromoted the drug and
downplayed the risks. OWEN, supra, at 615 n.79.
436. DOBBS, supra note 429, at i0i I.
437. OWEN, supra note 435, at 608-09.
438. DOBBS, supra note 429, at ioII (citing Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-directed
Prescription Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FooD DRUG COsM. L.J. 829, 830
(99)).
439. OWEN, supra note 435, at 6o9.
[Vol. 58:9671IOO
INFORMED CONSENT
Courts have recognized an exception to the requirement of informed
consent when the knowledge of the risk would harm the patient. 4 As
one court explained, this therapeutic exception is necessary since the
doctor's primary duty is to do what is best for the patient." "[W]here full
disclosure would be detrimental to a patient's total care and best
interests a physician may withhold such disclosure, for example, where
disclosure would alarm an emotionally upset or apprehensive patient."" 2
In the United States today, this is generally where the law stands. A
slight majority of states continue to apply the reasonable-doctor
standard, with the Canterbury reasonable-patient standard as the
minority alternative."3 As scholars have observed, "The law of informed
consent has undergone little analytic development since Canterbury.'
Under the learned intermediary rule, doctors are responsible for
informing patients of the risks of drug therapies. 5 Finally, the
therapeutic exception relieves doctors of the duty to disclose risks and
alternatives when disclosure would be detrimental to patient care.46
A few jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine to require doctors to
disclose other relevant information. For example, a few cases require the
doctor to disclose risks related to the doctor's health"7 or inexperience." 8
A handful of cases have required the disclosure of other facts that would
affect the patient's decision. Specifically, a few cases have required the
doctor to disclose that a prescribed treatment is experimental" 9 and that
44o. DOBBS, supra note 429, at 656.
441. Scott v. Bradford, 6o6 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. i98o); accord Morris, supra note 37, at 325.
442. Scott, 6o6 P.2d at 558; accord Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 86.
443. DOBBS, supra note 429, at 655; Noah, supra note 120, at 376.
444. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocrOR AND PATIENT at 8o (1984), quoted in Morris, supra
note 37, at 334.
445. See supra notes 435-39 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
447. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. I991) (affirming a judgment against
a doctor who failed to disclose his chronic alcohol abuse); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md.
1993) (holding that a complaint alleging doctor failed to disclose his HIV-positive status should not
have been dismissed). But see K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561-62 (Minn. 1995) (holding that
although the doctor was HIV-positive the complaint failed to state a cause of action where the patient
was not actually exposed to the virus); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 199i)
(holding a doctor was not required to disclose his alcoholism).
448. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 505 (Wis. 1996) (holding a doctor was required to
disclose his limited experience with an extremely difficult procedure). But see Duttry v. Patterson, 771
A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding the duty of informed consent was limited to the risks inherent in
the procedure and that the doctor was not liable for misrepresenting the number of times he had
performed the surgery (he said sixty times when it was only nine)); Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 216-17
(holding that only information about the medical procedure is required to be disclosed); Whiteside v.
Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1264-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a surgeon was not required to
disclose that he had never performed the surgery before and had only attended a two-day class on it
where it was demonstrated on pigs).
449. Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 869 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (requiring disclosure
that bone screws were in the investigational stage); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 350-51 (Ariz.
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the doctor has a financial interest that might affect the exercise of
professional judgment.45 For example, in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, the California Supreme Court held that doctors
had a duty to disclose their research interest in developing a cell line
from the patient's spleen cells and their financial interest in patenting
this cell line.45' As the next section will explain, in my view, this last line
of cases should be expanded to require doctors to disclose off-label
prescriptions and conflicts of interest resulting from drug-company
marketing.
B. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT TO REQUIRE
DISCLOSURE OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
As we have seen, the doctrine of informed consent promotes patient
autonomy in medical decision-making. Under the reasonable-patient
approach, doctors must disclose information that would be material to
the patient's decision to consent to a recommended course of treatment,
including risks from drug therapies. The question thus becomes whether
off-label uses and drug-company influences are material to a patient's
consent to treatment. In my view, both are material. Since off-label uses
have not been proven safe and effective under FDA standards and since
most are not supported by scientific evidence,452 they may carry
uncertainties and risks that the patient would not accept. And, in
deciding whether to accept the risks of any drug-especially an off-label
drug-the patient would want to know whether drug-company marketing
1978) (requiring disclosure that treatment was considered investigational by the FDA); Moore v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 484 (Cal. 1989) (referring to CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24173(C) (West 2OO6)) (requiring the physician to disclose that the physician is conducting a medical
experiment on a patient); Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (1992) (requiring disclosure
that liquid silicone injections were not FDA approved); Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254-55
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (requiring disclosure that surgical procedure was experimental).
450. Moore, 793 P.2d 479, 483 -8 4 (Cal. 199o) (referring to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 654.2
prohibiting a physician from referring a patient to an organization in which the physician has a
significant beneficial interest without a prior written disclosure of that interest); Shea v. Esensten, 622
N.W.2d 130, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding a doctor could be held liable for failing to disclose
HMO restrictions on expert referrals under ERISA regulations for fiduciary duties); D.A.B. v. Brown,
570 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding a physician who received illegal kickbacks
from a drug company for prescribing a growth hormone could be liable for medical malpractice but
finding that the claim failed based on the lack of injury and failure to file within the statute of
limitations). But see Corrigan, 874 F. Supp. at 659 (holding a patient is entitled to be informed of
surgical risks, but not of a doctor's financial interest in a company which manufactured a medical
device); Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 505-06 (Il. 2000) (declining to recognize a cause of action
where a doctor failed to disclose HMO incentives to discourage expert referrrals).
451. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-85. But see Corrigan, 874 F. Supp. at 657, 659 (holding a patient is
entitled to be informed of surgical risks, but not of a doctor's financial interest in a company which
manufactured a medical device).
452. Radley et al., supra note 5o, at 1021.
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may have influenced the doctor's prescribing decision.53
i. Duty to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions
Patients believe that their prescriptions are for FDA-approved
uses.454 Off-label uses are not supported by the extensive research and
rigorous scrutiny that is required for FDA approval, and most off-label
uses are not supported by scientific evidence.455 When a drug is
prescribed off-label, it has not necessarily been proven effective at all in
treating the patient's condition4, 6 and has certainly not been proven more
effective than older, approved drugs.457 Indeed, the off-label use may be
detrimental."' In short, the patient thinks the drug has been proven safe
and effective for the prescribed treatment following rigorous scrutiny by
the FDA, but with off-label uses it has not.
Is the fact of off-label use material to the patient's decision? Well, it
certainly ought to be. Basically, the doctor may not know whether it will
help or harm the patient. If an FDA-approved drug is available, most
patients would undoubtedly prefer the thoroughly-tested drug that has
been proven safe and effective to the untested, potentially dangerous,
off-label alternative. And if an approved generic is available, most
patients would undoubtedly prefer the well-tested, safe, effective, and
cheaper generic. Moreover, even for FDA-approved uses, some risks are
discovered later. For example, the unexpected cardiovascular risks of
Cox2 drugs including Vioxx were not known until they were widely
prescribed to a large patient population.459 The longer a drug is in use, the
more is known about its potential risks.46 So it is generally safer to take
the older, approved drug with an established history than the newer, off-
label drug where additional risks may yet be discovered. 46'
Surprisingly, given the frequency of off-label prescribing and the
attendant risks, research has disclosed no case holding that the doctrine
of informed consent requires a doctor to disclose that a prescription is off
label.46 Indeed, only a handful of cases have considered the question. In
453. While the research on patients' attitudes toward drug company marketing is limited, it
suggests that "patients are more likely than doctors to believe that gifts may influence prescribing
behavior and that patients tend to view gifts that influence prescribing behavior as inappropriate."
Blumenthal, supra note 131, at I888.
454. HARRIS POLL, supra note 4, at I; Tansey, supra note 4.
455. Radley et al., supra note io, at 1O2i.
456. Id.
457. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 98.
458. Radley et al., supra note io, at io2i.
459. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., supra note 74, at 1-2.
460. GREIDER, supra note 37, at 98.
465. See id.
462. A few cases have held that the off-label status of a prescription is relevant under a general
negligence theory if the defendant doctor has been careless, imprudent or unprofessional. See
Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, I5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). One case, not officially reported, found
that failure to disclose risks associated with off-label use created a question of fact on informed
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several cases involving pedicle screws, the courts have concluded that
off-label use was not a required disclosure. 463 In these cases, the bone
screws were approved for long and flat bones like leg and arm bones and
then were used off-label in spinal fusion operations.46' The courts
concluded that the lack of FDA approval was not necessarily material to
the patient's decision to undergo surgery.46' As one court explained, FDA
classifications "do not speak directly to the medical issues surrounding
the particular surgery.
This view reflects the position of the authors of the only article
examining the issue.46, In their view, FDA-approval is outside the
doctrine of informed consent since it is medically irrelevant to medical
risk.46' They also argue that disclosure would unduly frighten patients
who would equate the lack of FDA approval with FDA disapproval and
lead them to refuse optimal treatments. 469 And finally, they argue that
consent sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Chandler v. Simpson, No. 17974-5-111,
2000 WL 426441, at *4, *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2000). One case assumed that an innovative use of
a medical device would be subject to the requirement of informed consent, but found the action
barred by the statute of limitations. Trantafello v. Med. Ctr. of Tarzana, 227 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986).
463. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1014, 94o8-0002, 1996 WL 107556, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Bone Screw Litigation] (holding that disclosure was not required
because FDA labels for a medical device do not speak directly to the medical issues); Alvarez v. Smith
714 So. 2d 652, 654-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that disclosure was not required because
FDA status of bone screws was not a medical risk); Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 922 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that disclosure of FDA labeling of bone screws as a class III device was
not required because FDA status did not purport to weigh in on medical judgment); Sita v. Long
Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 22 A.D.3d 743, 743-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that medical
center was not required to disclose FDA regulatory status of bone screws); Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d
225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that disclosure was not required because the off-label use of
screws was not itself a material risk, and because the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine);
Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d IOI, io6-o8 (Pa. 2001) (holding that disclosure was not
required because FDA labeling of bone screws as a class III device was merely administrative, and did
not constitute a material fact or risk in the surgical procedure); Piazza v. Myers, 37 Pa. D. & C.4th 322,
325-26 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1997), available at 1997 WL 1133693, *2 (holding that FDA status of a device
was not a proper subject matter for an informed consent claim); see also Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at
72 (arguing that "off-label" reflects legal status, not a medical fact); C. Murray Harris, Informed
Consent: Physicians Need Not Inform Patients of the FDA Classification of a Medical Device-
Southard v. Temple University Hospital, 27 Am. J.L. & MED. 489, 490"91 (2001) (discussing the
Southard decision and its impact on medical practice). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 36oc(a)(i)(C) (2002)
(definition of a class III device).
464. Bone Screw Litigation, 1996 WL 107556, at *i.
465. Id. at *5; Alvarez, 714 So. 2d at 654; Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 918; Klein, 673 N.E.2d at 231;
Southard, 781 A.2d at 107.
466. Southard, 781 A.2d at lo7.
467. Beck & Azari, supra note 2. This article has been repeatedly cited by the courts considering
prescriptions for off-label use. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001); In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817,829 (3d Cir. 1998); Alvarez, 714 So. 2d at 654;
Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 919; Southard, 781 A.2d at 1O4; Richardson, 44 S.W.3 d at 9.
468. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 72.
469. Id. at 85.
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requiring disclosure would impose an undue burden on doctors whose
attention would be diverted from medical literature to legalistic FDA
administrative regulations.47°
In my view, these concerns fail to overcome the policy of patient
autonomy and self-determination embodied in the doctrine of informed
consent. First, with respect to relevance, the fact that a drug has not been
proven safe and effective for a particular ireatment under the rigorous
FDA standards is certainly relevant to the decision of whether to take
the drug. Lack of approval does not necessarily mean that the drug is
dangerous or ineffective, but it should raise a concern about safety that
the patient should weigh in deciding whether to consent to the treatment
since it has not been proven safe and effective for the prescribed
purpose. Since most off-label uses are not supported by scientific
evidence, they may be ineffective or even detrimental.47' At the very least
a patient should be informed as to whether there is an FDA-approved
alternative and why the doctor is recommending the off-label use
instead.
Second, as to undue patient fear, the doctor can educate the patient
about off-label uses in the informed-consent conversation. The notion
that patients cannot make competent health-care decisions when
provided truthful information flies in the face of the values supporting
the doctrine of informed consent. This argument reflects the outdated,
paternalistic view that patients are like timid children who cannot be
trusted to make intelligent decisions about their own health care.
Moreover, in the exceptional case where disclosure would be detrimental
to the patient's health, the therapeutic exception to the informed consent
requirement already allows a doctor to withhold the information.47z
Rather than routinely withholding this information from perfectly
competent patients, doctors should disclose it to further the policy of
patient autonomy underlying the doctrine of informed consent.
Moreover, the argument that off-label disclosure will discourage
overly timid patients from electing the best course of treatment assumes
that the off-label use actually is the best course of treatment. But that
assumption is dubious because off-label uses are often unproven either as
to safety or efficacy.473 Compared to an FDA-approved treatment, the
off-label use may be more effective, equally effective, less effective,
totally ineffective, or actually detrimental. In many cases, the doctor
simply doesn't know. As Dr. Arnold Relman, a former editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine observed, "You're taking a medicine
470. Id. at ioo-oi.
471. Radley et al., supra note 1o, at 1021, 1026.
472. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
473. See Radley et al., supra note io, at 1021, IO26.
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because a company needs to market it. Who knows if it will work?" 474
While some believe that patients will be overly reluctant to consent to
off-label uses, the truth may well be that doctors are overly confident in
prescribing them.4 75 The doctor's confidence in an off-label use may have
been induced by exaggerated drug-company claims based on unreliable
research delivered over a gourmet dinner that clouds the doctor's
judgment with an unconscious desire to reciprocate.476 The patient's
caution may be the needed antidote to the doctor's unwarranted reliance
on drug-company marketing. In any event, under the doctrine of
informed consent, it should be the patient's choice.
Finally, determining FDA status is far from an onerous burden. The
information about FDA approval is readily available in the approved
PPI, 47 the PDR,478 and on-line services. 479 In fact, the FDA has recently
taken additional steps to make this information readily available to
doctors. As of June 2006, the FDA will require drug manufacturers to
provide the FDA-approved uses and side effects of their prescription
drugs in a computer format that will be readily accessible to doctors'
computers and hand-held devices. 48  In addition, the FDA is
standardizing and simplifying the approval information to make it more
readily available and understandable.48' And, the FDA is currently
issuing alerts to patients and doctors on its website.42
Medical literature supports the feasibility of disclosing off-label uses.
Specifically, in 2006, a multidisciplinary group developed a policy for off-
label prescribing for medical centers."' It concluded that for innovative
off-label uses where the prescribing is reasonable but not sufficiently
tested to allay concerns about safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness,
"physicians... must meet their ethical obligations by ensuring that the
patient is informed and provides consent prior to administering the
drug. ''484 Indeed, one insurance company has disseminated a standard
474. Chris Adams & Alison Young, Off-Label Prescription Case Reflects Federal Concern over
Unsafe Uses, KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, May 14, 2004, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/
iGI-I i8304533.html.
475. See Radley et al., supra note Io, at 1021 (finding that most off-label uses were not supported
by substantial scientific evidence).
476. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
480. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labelling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 7 Fed. Reg. 3922,3929 (Jan. 24, 2006).
481. Id. at 3922.
482. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
483. Nicole Ansani et al., Designing a Strategy to Promote Safe, Innovative Off-Label Use of
Medications, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 255, 255 (2006).
484. Id. at 259; accord Jan M. Keltz, Off-Label Use of Prescription Medication: Nursing
Implications, 30 NEPHROLOGY NURSING J. 99, 99 (2003) ("From a liability standpoint, patients should be
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form for doctors to obtain informed consent to off-label uses. 5' Thus,
rather than being unfeasibly burdensome, off-label disclosure is the
recommended medical practice.
A few hypotheticals illustrate how the proposed expansion of
informed consent is likely to operate. First, assume a patient suffers from
chronic back pain. Several alternative treatments are available, including
generics that have been FDA-approved for back pain and new, on-patent
drugs that have not. Most patients would undoubtedly elect a generic
drug that has been proven safe and effective for back pain rather than an
epilepsy drug that has never been approved for pain management.
Moreover, the generic will be much cheaper than the off-label, on-patent
alternative. Under these circumstances, the patient should be informed
of the alternatives and given the choice. If the generic proves ineffective,
the patient can always reconsider her choice.
Second, assume a patient is dying of cancer. There are no FDA-
approved drugs to treat her advanced condition, and scant reliable
research on off-label alternatives. Some patients will be willing to try the
off-label therapies, and some will not. As explained by FDA
Commissioner Jane E. Henney, "We all recognize that most patients
faced with grave diseases are willing to assume greater risks." 6 But some
patients will be more risk-averse, preferring to focus on the quality of
their remaining time rather than undergoing risky treatments with
unstudied and potentially debilitating side effects. Again, under these
circumstances, the patient should be given the information necessary to
make this profoundly personal decision.
Third, assume an irrational, emotionally-overwrought patient with a
serious medical condition would be likely to reject an off-label
prescription despite extensive, reliable research showing that it is by far
the best treatment and poses few risks. In this case, the therapeutic
exception would apply. As explained briefly above, since the doctor's
ultimate responsibility is to do what is best for the patient, where
disclosure would be detrimental to the patient's care, disclosure is not
required.4"7 In short, in each of these cases, applying the doctrine of
informed that a drug being prescribed is for an unlabeled use and informed of the rationale for the
suggested treatment."); Abel Torres, The Use of Food and Drug Administration-Approved
Medications for Unlabeled (Off-Label) Uses, 13o ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 32, 35-36 (1994) ("Although
no specific informed consent appears to be required, unlabeled drug use best serves the patient and
protects the physician from liability when it is accompanied by informed consent that adequately
informs the patient of the innovative nature of the therapy together with the greater uncertainty of
risk.").
485. OPHTHALMIC MUr. INS. Co., INFORMED CONSENT FOR OFF-LABEL USE OF A DRUG OR DEVICE I
(2oo4), http://www.omic.com/resources/risk-man/forms/consent/Sample%200ff-label%2oconsent %20
language.rtf.
486. Henney, supra note 66.
487. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
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informed consent-including the established therapeutic exception-
would maximize patient autonomy without compromising patient care.
While there are ho cases holding that a doctor is required to disclose
that a use is off-label, a few courts have concluded that disclosure is
required when the treatment had received no FDA approval at all and
when the FDA still considered the drug "investigational. ' '488 A drug is
categorized as "investigational" after animal testing when the
manufacturer begins clinical testing on humans.489 As one court
explained:
It is a reasonable assumption that most patients, confronted with a
doctor's recommendation for injection of a foreign substance, presume
that such substance has been the subject of official testing,
consideration, and approval, and implicitly or explicitly rely on this
presumption as part of the basis of their "consent" to the treatment.49
In other words, according to the court, since patients presume that
therapies have survived the rigorous FDA-approval process for safety
and efficacy and since their consent is based on that presumption,
doctors should disclose the lack of FDA approval so that patients can
factor that uncertainty and potential risk into their decision.
In my view, the patient's presumption of official testing and approval
is equally operative when drugs are prescribed off-label and consent to
the treatment is given with that understanding. Patients believe a drug
has been officially tested and approved for the treatment the doctor is
recommending.49' If a doctor prescribes a drug to treat back pain, the
patient thinks it has been approved to treat pain, not epilepsy or
depression. Where a drug has received FDA approval for a treatment,
the patient justifiably presumes that the FDA has found it safe and
effective for that purpose. But when it is prescribed off-label, the patient
mistakenly presumes it has survived the FDA approval process and has
been found safe and effective for that purpose. Contrary to the patient's
presumption, the drug or device has not been proven safe or effective for
488. See supra note 449 regarding investigational status; see also Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537
F.2d io98, 1100-02 (ioth Cir. 1976) (holding that informed consent was required where a doctor
learned about using an unusually high dose of radiation to treat cancer at a medical conference and
used it in treating the patient without disclosing that it was a departure from standard treatment);
Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 657, 658 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (experimental status of bone
screws held to be relevant to informed consent claim); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 350-51 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978) (requiring disclosure that treatment was considered investigational by the FDA);
Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that failure to disclose
liquid silicone injections' FDA status was material and relevant to malpractice claim); Estrada v.
Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (requiring disclosure that surgical procedure was
experimental).
489. See Henry, supra note 6I, at 367.
49 o . Retkwa, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 712 n.6.
491. Tansey, supra note 4.
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the prescribed use according to FDA standards of proof.492 To correct the
patient's misunderstanding about the government's finding of safety and
effectiveness, the off-label status should be disclosed.493 Since the FDA
has not found it safe and effective for the purpose, patients surely would
want to know the doctor's basis for recommending an off-label
treatment. As we have seen, with off-label uses, the doctor may be
relying on flimsy, company-sponsored "research" presented by company-
paid consultants at company-sponsored CME programs followed by a
gourmet meal and a round of golf.494 Even worse, the doctor may be
relying on little or no scientific evidence at all.495 Caution and skepticism
are warranted and should generate doctor-patient discussions about
treatment risks and alternatives.
2. Duty to Disclose Conflicts of Interest
Although doctors deny it, drug-company promotions influence
prescribing decisions."' Free CME programs directly result in increased
prescribing.497 Moreover, drug companies' financial relationships with
doctors may have an even greater influence. Doctors who sign up for a
company's speakers' bureau can make thousands of dollars promoting
the company's drugs."' In many Phase IV trials, doctors receive bounties
for prescribing the company's drug to their patients.499 Many doctors are
paid handsomely as consultants or advisors to the drug company."
Doctors readily prescribe drugs which they receive as free samples."'
And even small gifts have been proven to affect prescribing decisions."'
This pervasive, drug-company influence on prescribing decisions is
unknown to patients. While doctors may not be conscious of it, and often
492. See Radley et al., supra note Io, at 1021.
493. It could be argued that the patient's mistaken belief that the drug has been found safe and
effective by the FDA vitiates the patient's consent to the off-label use. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (providing that consent is ineffective if it is induced by a substantial mistake
known to the defendant).
494. See supra notes I61-63 and accompanying text.
495. Radley, supra note to, at 1023.
496. See supra notes 16r-63 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text. One study found that doctors who accepted
an all-expense paid trip to sponsored symposia believed that the programs would not influence their
prescribing decision, but actually increased their prescriptions threefold for the promoted drugs over
the two years following the event. Peter S. Kussin, Prescription for Trouble, DUKE MED. NEWS, Winter
2002, http://www.dukemednews.org/news/controversy.php?id=6285.
498. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. For example, Dr. Peter Gleason admitted that he
received more than $ioo,ooo last year alone for promoting a narcolepsy drug for depression and pain
relief. Alex Berenson, Indictment of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2OO6, at
Ai. He was indicted for conspiring with the drug manufacturer to recommend the drug for potentially
dangerous uses. Id.
499. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
500. See supra Part I.B.4 .
5o. See supra notes 314-25 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 332-7o and accompanying text.
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vehemently deny it, these influences present the appearance and often
the reality of a conflict of interest.
The doctrine of informed consent should be expanded to require the
disclosure of drug company influences that create conflicts of interest or
the appearance of conflicts of interest. A few cases have already
recognized the duty of a doctor to disclose conflicts of interest in
analogous situations. Specifically, in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, the California Supreme Court held that doctors had a duty to
disclose their research interest in developing a cell line from the patient's
spleen cells and their financial interest in patenting this cell line."
In Moore, the patient visited the UCLA Medical Center after being
diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia. 4 UCLA doctors recommended that
his spleen be removed. 5 Without informing the patient, the doctor also
made arrangements to conduct research on the patient's spleen to
develop valuable commercial products 6 Following the surgery, the
doctor required him to return repeatedly for follow-up care." Each time
blood, bone, skin, marrow, and sperm samples were drawn.' But the
doctor never disclosed, and in fact denied, having any financial interest in
research relating to the patient's samples.5" The doctor used the patient's
cells to develop a patented cell line. ' Under an agreement negotiated
with the Genetics Institute to develop the cell line, one doctor acquired
75,000 shares of common stock and became a paid consultant.5"' The
doctors and Regents also negotiated payments of more than $400,000.5"2
As the California Supreme Court concluded, the doctor had a
financial and research interest which his fiduciary duty required him to
disclose.513 Perhaps the splenectomy and follow-up care were all
medically appropriate. But perhaps the doctor's recommendations were
tainted-even unconsciously-by his conflicting personal interests. As
the court explained, the "patient would want to know whether the
physician had an economic interest that might affect the physician's
professional judgment."5 '4 A patient should be free of any suspicion that
the doctor's judgment is swayed by a profit motive.5' The court drew an
503. 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. i99o).
504. Id. at 481.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 481, 485-86.
510. Id. at 481-82.
5IL Id. at481.
512. Id. at 481-82
513 . Id. at 485.
514. Id. at 483.
515 . Id.
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analogy to statutes requiring doctors to disclose whether they had a
financial interest in organizations, including laboratories, when making
referrals for treatment."6 Moreover, as the court explained, in treating a
patient in whom the doctor has a research interest, the doctor's research
interest may influence his or her medical judgment."' As the court
concluded:
The possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has
affected the physician's judgment is something that a reasonable
patient would want to know in deciding whether to consent to a
proposed course of treatment. It is material to the patient's decision
and, thus, a prerequisite to informed consent."'
Turning to drug company marketing influences, the Moore analysis
applies. For example, consider the Phase IV trials where doctors are paid
by drug companies to prescribe certain drugs. As in Moore, patients
would want to know if the doctor's opportunity to gain financially is
influencing the decision to prescribe a certain drug. Also as in Moore,
these doctors have both a research interest and a financial interest that
might be affecting their judgment. The patient is entitled to know that
the doctor's decision to prescribe a particular drug might be influenced-
perhaps unconsciously-by the $2000 the doctor will receive as a result
of the prescription or the $20,000 the doctor will receive by enrolling ten
patients. The same is true where doctors receive educational grants or
earn substantial sums as drug company spokespersons and consultants.
The patient should be given the information necessary to weigh whether
the doctor's prescribing decision has been influenced by the income she
earns from expanding the drug's market. And, more subtly, research
establishes that free CME and even modest gifts influence prescribing
decisions."9 If the drug company's marketing is influencing prescribing
decisions, that influence is clearly "extraneous to the patient's health," in
the words of the Moore court, and material to the patient's decision.
As with disclosure of off-label prescribing, medical literature
supports disclosure of financial relationships that might create conflicts
of interest. For example, a 2005 advisory opinion on the Code of Ethics
of the American Academy of Ophthalmology recognized that the
potential for a conflict of interest arises when a doctor has a
professionally-related commercial or financial interest. 2 Such interests
include consultancies, commercial support of educational meetings,
516. Id. at 483-84.
517. Id. at 484.
518. Id.
519. See supra notes 332-7o and accompanying text.
520. AM. ACAD. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, ADVISORY OPINION OF THE CODE OF ETHICS, DISCLOSURE OF
PROFESSIONALLY RELATED COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERESTS (2005), http://www.aao.org/aao/
member/ethics/disclosure.cfm.
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contracts with economic incentives, implied obligations to promote a
product, and drug-company gifts."' The advisory opinion requires these
potential conflicts to be disclosed to the patient.5"
Some argue that disclosure is insufficient to solve the problems
created by conflicts of interest."3 Economic scholars have found that
people do not really understand conflicts of interest and that disclosure
may enhance trust, rather than inject skepticism into the process.524 Since
most people are inclined to trust their doctors, they are confident their
doctor will overcome the conflict, especially when it is voluntarily
disclosed.5 Reflecting this view is the recent article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association proposing that because of their leadership
role in the profession, academic medical centers should adopt policies to
address many of the common pharmaceutical marketing practices that
create conflicts of interest."26 Specifically, it urges medical centers to
adopt policies to eliminate or modify practices including providing small
gifts, meals, and samples, continuing medical education, speakers'
bureaus, ghost-writing, and consulting and research contracts. 27
Although I agree that prohibition is preferable, disclosure is a
feasible step in the right direction."' First, disclosure will educate the
public about drug company practices and may inject a bit of caution.
While the research is limited, one study found that "patients are more
likely than doctors to believe that gifts may influence prescribing
behavior and that patients tend to view gifts that influence prescribing
behavior as inappropriate." '529 This suggests that a better-informed
patient will be a more cautious patient, which would be a welcome
counterweight to the excessive influence of industry marketing. Second,
unlike the recent AMA proposal which is limited to medical schools, the
informed consent requirement would apply to all doctors, whether in an
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Eric T. Rosenthal, Can the Medical Profession Tolerate Zero Tolerance When Just Saying No
to Drug Company Largess?, ONCOLOGY TIMES, Apr. Io, 2oo6, at 24.
524. Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of
Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2005).
525. Id. at 5-6.
526. Brennan, et al., supra note 39, at 430.
527. Id. Some academic medical centers are already taking steps to implement these proposals. For
example, the U.C. Davis Medical Center is considering three recommendations which would (i) ban
gifts, meals, travel expenses, payment for attending meetings or participating in online CME; (2) ban
free samples (which would be replaced by a voucher system for low-income patients); and (3) exclude
medical professionals with ties to drug or device manufacturers from committees that oversee drug or
device purchasing. Dorsey Griffith, UCD May Curb Doctors' Drug-Company Freebies, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 3, 2OO6, at AI.
528. See supra note 37 and accompanying text regarding the current political clout of the drug
industry; see also Okie, supra note 66, at lO63-64.
529. Blumenthal, supra note 131, at 1888 (citing R.V. Gibbons et al., A Comparison of Physicians'
and Patients' Attitudes toward Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 151 (1998)).
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academic medical center or a community practice. Third, in contrast to
the AMA proposal, which lacks any enforcement mechanism, the risk of
tort liability gives informed consent teeth and should discourage doctors
from engaging in the most egregious practices. 30 Finally, adopting an
informed consent requirement will provide injured patients a remedy
where doctors have failed to make adequate disclosures.53" '
In the long term, the initiatives to study the impact of industry
marketing on health care should focus academic researchers, medical
practitioners, and patients and their advocates on the negative aspects of
current practices.53 ' Requiring disclosure of marketing influences could
be a useful complement to these initiatives. Over time this attention
should lead to a critical mass of public opinion supporting appropriate
restrictions on drug-company practices in the interest of patient safety,
the ethical practice of medicine, and public health.
III. PROPOSED DISCLOSURES FOR OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, composed a thoughtful set of questions for patients to ask their
doctors to elicit information about off-label uses and conflicts of
interest.33 But, in my view, this approach puts the burden on the wrong
person. Most patients are unaware of the widespread practice of off-label
prescribing and the billions of dollars the drug industry spends to
influence prescribing decisions. Only the rare and exceptionally assertive
patient will have the knowledge and courage to question her doctor as
Dr. Angell suggests. Rather than putting the burden on the patient to
inquire, I think the doctor should be required to affirmatively disclose
this information. The disclosures I propose are set out below: Part III.A
presents the proposed disclosures about off-label prescriptions, and
Part III.B covers the proposed disclosures about conflicts of interest.
530. See ToM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYrH 98-1I1O (2005) (explaining that medical
malpractice actions expose dangerous practices and improve patient safety by providing an incentive
for better practices).
531. Id. at iio-ii (explaining that medical malpractice actions provide needed compensation to
injured patients and actually undercompensate them for their medical expenses and lost income.)
532. See supra Part I.B.
533. ANGELL, supra note 7, at 261-62. Dr. Angell suggested that patients should ask the following:
What is the evidence that this drug is better than an alternative drug or some other
approach to treatment? Has the evidence been published in a peer-reviewed medical
journal? Or are you relying on information from drug company representatives? ... Is this
drug better only because it is given at a higher dose? Would a cheaper drug be as effective if
it were given at an equivalent dose? ... Are the benefits worth the side effects, the expense,
and the risk of interactions with other drugs I take? ... Is this a free sample? If so, is there a
generic drug or an equivalent drug I can use that is cheaper when the free samples run
out?... Do you have any financial ties with the company that makes this drug? For
example, do you consult for the company? Other than free samples, do you receive gifts
from drug companies? Are you being paid to put me on this drug and enroll me in a drug
company study? Do you make time for visits from drug company representatives?
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A. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS
" Is this drug FDA-approved for treatment of this condition?
" If not, is there an FDA-approved alternative?
" If so, what are the advantages of the off-label treatment over the
FDA-approved alternative?
" Is there a generic alternative?
" If so, what are the advantages of the off-label treatment over the
generic alternative?
* What research supports the off-label use? What is the source of
information about the off-label use? Has research about the off-
label use been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal? Or
are you relying on information from a drug-company
representative or a drug-company sponsored CME program?
B. PROPOSED DISCLOSURES OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
* Do you have any financial ties to the drug manufacturer including
stock ownership, a consulting contract, or membership on a
speakers' bureau?
" Are you conducting Phase IV trials on this drug? Will you receive
any compensation for prescribing this drug to the patient?
" Have you attended CME programs sponsored by the
manufacturer? Did the manufacturer provide the program at no
cost to you? Did it pay your expenses or provide you any
compensation or gifts for attending?
" Did you receive this drug as a free sample from the drug
company?
" Have you accepted any other gifts from the manufacturer?
CONCLUSION
Patients need to know the facts about off-label uses and conflicts of
interest to make well-informed health care decisions. Off-label
prescribing is in itself a concern, especially where research on the off-
label use is inadequate and FDA-approved alternatives are available.
Aggressive marketing is in itself a concern, especially where it creates
conflicts of interest for doctors. Together they expand the market for
treatments unsupported by any reliable scientific research, drive up the
cost of health care, and jeopardize patient safety. While disclosure of this
information may cause some patients to be reluctant to consent to
proposed treatments, this reluctance is an appropriate counterbalance to
the drug industry's excessive influence on prescribing decisions.
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